Kingdom of Macedonia (red) in 346 BC

From the page of the website historyofmacedonia.org (my additions in white)

The map above illustrates the extent of Philip’ kingdom at the end of the period under discussion here: at the start of this period, Thessaly and Chalcidice retained their independence, albeit that:

1. ✴most of the cities of Thessaly were Philip’s willing allies ; and
   

2. ✴Olynthus and the other cities of the Chalcidian League had recently agreed a treaty with him.
   

I have marked the locations at which Philip agreed to the four diplomatic marriages of this decade, which were (as we have seen) to:

1. ✴Audata of Illyria;
   

2. ✴Phila of Elimeia;
   

3. ✴Philinna of Larissa; and
   

4. ✴Olympias of Molossia.
   

Thessaly and the Third Sacred War (353-2 BC)

Map from Wikipedia: my additions in red

Thessaly and Macedonia

According to Diodorus, in 370/69 BC:

1. “... Jason, tyrant of Pherae, because of his superior shrewdness as a general and his success in attracting many of his neighbours into an alliance, prevailed upon the Thessalians to lay claim to the supremacy in Greece, ... since: 
   

2. ✴the Spartans had sustained a great disaster at Leuctra;
   

3. ✴the Athenians laid claim only to to the mastery of the sea;
   

4. ✴the Thebans were unworthy of first rank; and
   

5. ✴the Argives had been brought low by civil wars and internecine slaughter. 
   

6. So the Thessalians put Jason forward as leader of the whole [of Thessaly] and, as such, gave him supreme command in war.  Jason ... entered into alliance with King Amyntas [III] of Macedonia.  A peculiar coincidence occurred in this year, for three of those in positions of power died about the same time:
   

7. ✴Amyntas, ... [who] died after a rule of 24 years, leaving behind him three sons, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, and Alexander succeeded to the throne [as Alexander II] but ruled for only one year, [370/69 BC];
   

8. ✴Agesipolis, king of Sparta , died after ruling a year ... ; and
   

9. ✴Jason of Pherae, who had been chosen ruler of Thessaly and was reputed to be governing his subjects with moderation, was assassinated:
   

10. •either by seven young men who conspired together for the repute it would bring (as Ephorus writes,); or
    

11. •... by his own brother Polydorus, who was himself also assassinated only a year after succeeding to the position of leader”, (‘Library of History’, 15: 60: 1-5). 
    

Diodorus continued this account of mayhem in his account of 369/8 BC, when:

1. “Polydorus of Pherae the ruler Thessaly was poisoned by his nephew, Alexander, ... [who] ... was hated for his violent and severe rule.  Accordingly, ... some Larissaeans, called Aleuadae because of their noble descent, ... [went] to Macedonia [and] prevailed upon the King Alexander [II]to join them in overthrowing the tyrant.  But while they were occupied with these matters, Alexander of Pherae, learning of the preparations against him, gathered such men as were conveniently situated for the campaign, intending to give battle in Macedonia. But the Macedonian king, accompanied by refugees from Larissa, anticipated the enemy by invading Larissa with the army, and having been secretly admitted by the Larissaeans within the fortifications, he mastered the city with the exception of the citadel.   Later he took the citadel by siege, and, having also won the city of Crannon, at first covenanted to restore the cities to the Thessalians, but then, in contempt of public opinion, he brought into them garrisons of considerable strength and held the cities himself.  Alexander of Pherae, hotly pursued and alarmed at the same time, returned to Pherae”, (‘Library of History’, 15: 61: 2-5).
   

Diodorus then recorded that, later that year:

1. “The [Thebans], who had been summoned by the Thessalians to liberate their cities and to overthrow the tyranny of Alexander of Pherae, dispatched Pelopidas with an army to Thessaly ...When he arrived in Larissa, he found the acropolis garrisoned by Alexander [II] of Macedon, who surrendered.  Then proceeding into Macedon, where he made an alliance with Alexander[II], he took from him as a hostage his younger brother Philip, whom he sent to Thebes”, (‘Library of History’, 15: 67: 3-4).
   

Pompeius Trogus (as epitomised by Justinus) recorded that, when Alexander II:

1. “... made peace with the Thebans by [sending Philip to them as a] hostage, a circumstance that afforded [him] fine opportunities for improving his extraordinary abilities; for, being kept as a hostage at Thebes three years [ca. 368-5 BC],  ... [living] in the house of Epaminondas, an eminent philosopher as well as [the leading Theban commander].  Not long afterwards Alexander II [was assassinated in] a plot of his mother Eurydice ...”, (‘Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' Philippic Histories’, 7: 5: 2-5).
   

It is ironic then that, about a decade later, a ‘faction among the Aleuadae’ (at least some of whom presumably came from Larissa) travelled to Macedonia to seek Philip’s help against the sons of Jason, who had recently assassinated Alexander of Pherae. 

Outbreak of the Third Sacred War (356 BC)

Sławomir Sprawski (referenced below, 2010, at p. 186 and note 15) usefully summarised the events that led to the outbreak of the so-called Third Sacred War: 

1. “It all began with the decision of the [Delphic] Amphictyonic Council [see below] under the presidency of a Thessalian, Andronicos of Crannon, to banish a prominent citizen of Delphi, Astycrates, who [then] found refuge at Athens.  In 357 BC, ... the Thebans, probably with the Thessalians’ assistance, made accusations against the Phocians and the Spartans before the Amphictyonic Council.  The Council’s ruling (which imposed a fine on the Phocians for cultivating sacred land belonging to the sanctuary ... ) was rejected by the accused.  In the summer of 356 BC, the Phocians, led by Philomelos, decided to take radical action and seized the Delphic sanctuary, announcing themselves in charge.  Although they gained the support of Athens and Sparta, the majority of the Amphictyons, under the leadership of the Thebans and the Thessalians, objected and declared sacred war against the sacrilegists.”
   

Thus, in 356 BC, a state of war existed between:

1. ✴the Delphic Amphictyonic League (the league of the communities in central Greece and Thessaly that were responsible for the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi and the sanctuary of Demeter at Anthela, near Thermopylae), which was led by Thebes and included the cities of the Thessalian League); and 
   

2. ✴the Phocians (whose territory included Delphi), who were supported by the Athenians (and, at least in principle, by the Spartans). 
   

As we have seen, at the time of the events that led up to this war:

1. ✴Lycophron and Tisiphonus had assassinated their brother-in-law, Alexander of Pherae, and taken over the city; and
   

2. ✴Philip had intervened at the invitation of the Aleuadae to dissuade the new tyrants of Pherae from moving against their fellow-members of the Thessalian League.
   

Thus, as Peter Rhodes and Robin Osborne, referenced below, at p. 225) observed, it seems that:

1. “... in the Third Sacred War for the control of Delphi, the Phocians were:
   

2. ✴supported by both Athens and the tyrants of Pherea; and
   

3. ✴opposed by Thebes and the [Thessalian] koinon.”
   

However, it seems that all the Thessalians (including Pherae) participated together in the early stages of the war, since Diodorus recorded that, after the Phocians had defeated the Boeotians  and Locrians in the territory of the latter:

1. “... the Thessalians, together with the allies from neighbouring districts, having assembled [a force of about 6,000 men), arrived in Locris and, joining battle with the Phocians, met with a defeat by a hill called Argolas”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 30: 4). 
   

According to Diodorus, shortly thereafter:

1. “... Onomarchus, when he had been chosen general in supreme command [of the Phocian alliance], prepared a great supply of weapons from the bronze and iron [‘borrowed’ from the sanctuary at Delphi] and, having struck coinage from the silver and gold, distributed it among the allied cities, mainly giving it as bribes to the leaders of those cities.  Indeed he succeeded in corrupting many of the enemy too, some of whom he persuaded to fight on his side, and others he required to maintain the peace.  He easily accomplished everything because of men's greed. In fact, [by means of one of these bribes], he even persuaded the Thessalians, who were held in highest esteem amongst the allies, ... to maintain the peace”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 33: 2-3). 
   

As Sławomir Sprawski (referenced below, 2010, at p. 187) observed:

1. “It is not known [which Thessalians] received the money, [although they presumably included the tyrants of Pherae] ... .  There is no doubt that, if Onomarchos wanted to eliminate the Thessalians from the game, the easiest way was to for him to stir up another civil war [among the members of the Thessalian League]”.
   

Philip’s Entry into Thessaly (354 BC)

Sławomir Sprawski (referenced below, 2010, at p. 188)  argued that:

1. “After the ... defeat of the Thessalians at Argolas, Lycophron and Pitholaus probably decided to go back to the idea of fighting for power in the whole of Thessaly.  (At that time, their older brother Tisisphon was probably already dead.)”
   

This power-play presumably led to disquiet among the other Thessalian cities and, according to Diodorus, after Philip’s seizure of Methone, he:

1. “... entered Thessaly with his army in response to a summons from the Thessalians, [presumably those of Larissa and their allies] and made war  on Lycophron, tyrant of Pherae ... [When] Lycophron summoned an auxiliary force from his allies the Phocians:
   

2. ✴Phayllus, the brother of Onomarchus, was dispatched with 7,000 men; and
   

3. ✴[when] Philip defeated the Phocians and drove them out of Thessaly, Onomarchus [himselfn] came in haste with his entire military strength to the support of Lycophron ...  
   

4. When Philip in company with the Thessalians joined battle against the Phocians, Onomarchus ... defeated him in two battles and killed many of the Macedonians.  As for Philip, he was reduced to the uttermost perils, and his soldiers were so despondent that they [began to] desert him ... , [albeit that he finally managed to persuade them] to obey his orders”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 35: 1-2).
   

As Ian Worthington (referenced below, at p.58) observed, none of our surviving sources locate the site of Philip’s defeat, but it presumably occurred while he was besieging Pherae. 

The Greek strategist Polyaenus provided  some details on one of these battles:

1. “When Onomarchus was fighting against  Philip of Macedonia in Thessaly], he took up a position with a steep and craggy mountain in his rear.  He  placed a number of men who were expert in throwing stones on the top of the mountain ... [while he] ... formed up his army on the plain.  The Macedonians began the attack with their javelins, which the Phocians pretended they were unable to resist, and retreated half-way up the mountain.  The Macedonians eagerly pursued them until they came within reach of the men in ambush, who then emerged and started to attack the Macedonian phalanx with huge stones.  Onomarchus then gave the signal to the Phocians to turn around and renew the fight. The Macedonians, who were [now surrounded] ... were forced to make a difficult] retreat.  On this occasion, Philip ... is said to have cried out:
   

2. ‘We do not run away, but retreat like rams, ready to return to the fight with greater strength.’", (‘Stratagems’, 38 (Onomarchus): 2).
   

For whatever reason, Onomarchus did not follow up his victory, and Philip was able to retreat with what was left of his army to Macedonia.

Philip’s Return to Thessaly (353 BC)

According to Diodorus, in 353 BC, Philip:

1. “... returned [to Thessaly] with his army from Macedonia and [took] the field against Lycophron, tyrant of Pherae.  Lycophron, however, since he was no match for him in strength, [again] summoned reinforcements from his allies, the Phocians, promising jointly with them to organise the government of all Thessaly.   So when Onomarchus, [who had been campaigning in Chaeronea], came in haste to his support with 20,000 foot and 500 horse, Philip, having [already] persuaded the [other] Thessalians to prosecute the war with him, gathered them all together [and assembled an army of] more than 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 35: 3-4).
   

If Diodorus is correct, then Lycophron had secured the support of Onomarchus by promising him that, should they succeed in defeating Philip and the other Thessalian cities, they would share the hegemony of Thessaly. 

John Buckler reasonably argued (at p. 74) that the Thessalians who opposed the tyrants of Pherae must have agreed in advance that Philip would have overall command of their combined forces: significantly, this meant that he now had the substantial Thessalian cavalry at his disposal.  According to Pompeius Trogus, as epitomised by Justinus:

1. “... the Thebans and the Thessalians chose as general, not one of their own people (lest they should not be able to endure his rule if he should conquer) but Philip, king of Macedonia, voluntarily submitting to a foreigner the power that they dreaded in the hands of their own countrymen.  [For his part], Philip, as if he were the avenger of the sacrilege [at Delphi, rather than] the champion of the Theban cause, ordered all his soldiers to assume crowns of laurel and proceeded to battle as if under the leadership of [Apollo].”
   

In fact, there is no surviving evidence that the Thebans sent any appreciable support to the Thessalians on this occasion (something that Philip would presumably have been keen to avoid): the laurel crowns worn by the Macedonian troops and their Thessalian allies proclaimed that it would be Philip, their commander, who would lead them in the quest for revenge against the desecrators of Apollo’s shrine at Delphi.

So-Called Battle of the Crocus Fields (353 BC)

Krokion (likely site of the battle)

Map adapted from this webpage on the Thessalian Cavalry

It seems that Onomarchus approached Thessaly by following the coast road from Thermopylae, since, according to Diodorus, he engaged with Philip in:

1. “... [a] huge battle and, [since the Thessalian cavalry were superior in numbers and valour, Philip won.  Because Onomarchus had fled toward the sea when Chares the Athenian happened to be sailing by with many triremes, a great slaughter of the Phocians took place, for, in their effort to escape, the men would strip off their armour and try to swim out to the triremes”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 35: 5).
   

Modern scholars generally reject the idea that Chares just happened to be passing when the battle occurred, accepting instead John Buckler’s argument (at p. 74) that:

1. “Although the Athenians had done precious little to help Phocis in the Sacred War, Philip's Thessalian ambitions [probably now] spurred them to action: the Athenians had repeatedly lost to Philip in the north, [and] Onomarchos now offered them their best hope of striking a successful blow against him.  They [presumably therefore] dispatched Chares with a large fleet to Thessaly”.
   

As we have seen, Demosthenes subsequently complained to the Athenian assembly that:

1. “ ... your expeditions invariably arrive too late, whether at Methone or at Pagasae or at Potidaea ...”, (‘First Philippic’, 4: 36).
   

The likelihood is that, by the time that Chares reached the coast of Thessaly, the battle was already lost and many of the fleeing men of Onomarchus’ army drowned while attempting to reach his triremes.

Somewhat surprisingly, none of our surviving sources specify where this ‘huge battle’ took place.  John Buckler observed (at pp. 74-5) that it  is usually known as the battle of the [Crocian] Plain, in reference to a coastal plain to which Strabo located in the following passage:

1. “Halus  ... is about 60 stadia from Itonus. ... [and] is situated above the Crocian Plain; and the Amphrysus River flows close to its walls.  Below the Crocian Plain lies Phthiotic Thebes”, (‘Geography’, 9: 5: 8),
   

This plain on the western side of the Gulf of Pagasae is marked on the map above.  As Buckler observed:

1. “[Although] the location of the battlefield cannot be precisely identified.  The conflict [obviously] took place on a large plain that provided ample room in which some 40,000 men could operate and where thousands of cavalry maneuvered easily.  The appearance of the Athenian fleet during the fighting indicates that:
   

2. ✴the battlefield bordered the sea; and
   

3. ✴the plain lay in the vicinity of Pagasae, [which was the only port at which, had he arrived in time, Chares could have landed his army].
   

4. These factors led K. J. Beloch (no doubt rightly) to suggest the [Crocian] Plain as the field of battle, but the plain is so large and lacking in features that the exact location of the action cannot now be determined ...  Onomarchos led 20,000 infantry but only some 500 horse to Thessaly, a notoriously difficult place in which to campaign without cavalry. Philip's superiority in this arm proved decisive.”
   

Sławomir Sprawski (referenced below, 2020, at p. 108) observed that:

1. “If we accept this [scenario, then] we must also accept that the battle took place in a different place than [Lycophron and Onomachus had] expected, and perhaps this is why we do not hear of the participation of Pheraean warships in these events.”
   

In other words Onomachus, Chares and Lycophron had probably planned to assemble their collective armies at Pagasae.  We do not know where Philip had initially assembled his army, but he would have been well aware that Onomarchus was advancing into Thessaly along the coast road and would have had every incentive to engage with him before he reached Pherae and Pagasae.  The Crocian Plain would indeed have been an ideal spot for this engagement, not least because it would have allowed him to take maximum advantage from his superior cavalry.  Thus, although we have no hard evidence for the hypothesis that this was where the ‘huge battle’ was fought, it is (as far as I am aware) universally accepted.

Philip’s tactics proved to be entirely successful: Diodorus recorded that

1. “... more than 6,000 Phocians and mercenaries were killed [in the battle], including Onomarchus himself, and no fewer than 3,000 were taken captives.  Philip hanged Onomarchus and threw the rest into the sea as temple-robbers”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 35: 5-6).
   

By ordering his men to wear laurel in battle and by executing the survivors in the manner appropriate for ‘temple-robbers’, Philip overtly characterised the Macedonian/ Thessalian alliance as the leading protector of the sanctuary at Delphi (a claim that the Thebans would have strongly contested).

Fall of Pherae (352 BC)

As noted above, Lycophron and Pitholaus, the tyrants of Pherae, had played no part in the battle at the Crocian Plain.  This is unlikely to have been a voluntary decision:

1. ✴Philip may have had them under siege; or
   

2. ✴they may have awaited Onomarchus and Chares at Pagasae, unaware (until it was too late) that Philip had destroyed Onomarchus’ army before it had reached the rendezvous. 
   

Without allies, theirs was a lost cause: as Diodorus recorded, they subsequently (and sensibly):

1. “... handed Pherae over to Philip.  Under the terms of a truce, they brought together their 2,000 mercenaries and, [withdrew from Thessaly - see below] ...”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 37: 3).
   

Diodorus recorded that Philip then: 

1. “... restored freedom to the city ... [and settled] all the other affairs of Thessaly.  [He then advanced to Thermopylae, intending to make war on the Phocians [(see below)]”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 38: 1-2).
   

We should probably understand Diodorus’ claim that Philip restored the freedom of Pherae to mean that he installed a government there that would represent his own interests while being:

1. ✴acceptable to the other Thessalian cities; and
   

2. ✴at least tolerable to the people of Pherae.
   

However, although it seems that Pherae remained at least nominally self-governing, it was not left unscathed by recent events: in a speech that Demosthenes probably made in early 349 BC (in which he argued in favour of Athenian support for the Olynthians against Philip - see below), he:

1. ✴reminded his audience that that, having:
   

2. “... invaded Thessaly and then, having settled Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia and the rest of that country to suit his purposes, he went off to Thrace [see below] ...”, (‘First Olynthiac’, 1: 12-13); and
   

3. ✴then went on to gloat that the Thessalians:
   

4. “... have formally resolved to demand the restitution of Pagasae and have hindered [Philip] from fortifying Magnesia, (‘First Olynthiac’, 1: 22).
   

This probably means that Philip had installed a garrison in the citadel of Pherae and taken direct control of the port at Pagasae and the Magnesian peninsula, both of which had presumably been previously under the control of the Pherean tyrants. 

Philip’s Status in Thessaly After the Fall of Pherae

Sławomir Sprawski (referenced below, 2003, at p. 59) observed that: 

1. “After the defeat of Onomarchus and the tyrants of Pherae in 352 BC, there was no opponent who could effectively counterbalance Philip’s influence in Thessaly, which naturally must have deepened its dependence on Philip.”
   

He observed (at p. 61) that, while it is possible that Philip was elected as leader of the Thessalian League, it is:

1. “ ... impossible to identify the exact time of [this putative] election: it might have taken place after [Philip’s victory]: 
   

2. ✴[at] the battle of the Crocian Field in 353 BC; [or] 
   

3. ✴... in the Sacred War in 346 BC.”
   

He also observed (at p. 61) that;

1. “It is equally problematic to establish to what position the Thessalians [might have] appointed Philip (i.e., what his title and authority was).  According to the majority of researchers, Philip was elected archon.”
   

However, he pointed out (at p. 63) that:

“It is rather telling that we have no evidence that the persons who actually ruled Thessaly held the office of archon ... On the other hand, the persons who [are known to have] held this title (e.g. Agelaos or Daochos) remain only names to us.

He concluded (at p. 64) that:

“Undoubtedly Philip won a special position among the Thessalians, who relinquished the command of their army and the right to customs and revenues, probably in wartime.  Surely he was given these privileges legally, with the support of the majority.  The legitimisation of his position in Thessaly need not have meant that he was elected archon of the League. If the title was not accompanied by any special rights and, [since it was not particularly attractive to Jason [of Pherae, who chose to be elected as tagos], it need not have been attractive to Philip either.   ... In my opinion, the greatest doubts about Philip’s appointment to archon follow from the fact that, although this event was unprecedented, it passed unnoticed by his contemporaries. It is hard to believe that Demosthenes or Isocrates would have limited themselves to just a few allusions if they had been familiar with this fact.

Philip’s March on Thermopylae

According to Diodorus, after Onomarchus’ death at the battle at the Crocian Plain, his brother Phayllus began to raise another army, and:

1. “... since he had an inexhaustible supply of money, he [was able to] gather a large body of mercenaries, and to persuade many allies to join him in renewing the war:
   

2. ✴the [Spartans], for example, sent him 1,00o soldiers;
   

3. ✴the Achaeans sent 2,000 soldiers; and
   

4. ✴the Athenians 5,000 foot soldiers and 400 cavalry, with Nausicles as their general; and
   

5. [Furthermore], the tyrants of Pherae, Lycophron and [his younger brother], Pitholaus, who were bereft of allies after the death of Onomarchus, had handed Pherae over to Philip and, under the terms of a truce, brought together their 2,000 mercenaries and, taking refuge with Phayllus, joined the Phocians as allies”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 37: 3).
   

Demosthenes (in a speech that he delivered in 343 BC) noted that the Athenians’ intervention at Thermopylae  in 352 BC had been:

1. “... made at a cost of more than 200 talents ...”, (‘On the Embassy’, 19: 84).
   

According to Diodorus, when Philip finally:

1. “... advanced [from Thessaly] to Thermopylae, intending to make war on the Phocians, ... the Athenians prevented him from penetrating the pass”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 38: 1). 
   

Diodorus might have relied here on Demosthenes’ claim that:

1. “... even though no-one [else] in the whole world (either Greek or barbarian) sent aid to [the Phocians in 352 BC] ... , Philip was unable even to approach the pass”, (‘On the Embassy’, 19: 319).
   

However, it is clear from  his earlier passage that Philip did not simply turn back at Thermopylae because of the Athenians had finally managed to assemble an army with which to oppose him:

1. ✴Pitholaus had also raised a new mercenary army and secured additional support from the Spartans and the Acheans; and
   

2. ✴Philip had allowed Lycophron, Pitholaus and their 2,000 mercenaries to leave Pherae and join him.
   

Furthermore, Philip could not have expected support from the Thebans (who would hardly have welcomed the sight of Philip storming through the pass at the head of an army wearing laurel crowns and supported by the Thessalian cavalry).  It seems to me that, if Philip had wanted to take on the Phocians and the Athenians at this point, he would not have given them the enough time to regroup in this way.  In other words, the likelihood is that the Phocian War was no longer Philip’s top priority: 

1. ✴he had belatedly marched on Thermopylae in order to placate his Thessalian allies; but
   

2. ✴he had no intention of intervening in a war in which Athenians and Phocians were pitted against Thebans, provided, of course, that his interests in Thessaly were not compromised. 
   

In my view, Demosthenes had been much closer to the mark in 349 BC, when he had observed that:

1. “[Philip] invaded Thessaly [in 353 BC] and then, having settled Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia and the rest of that country to suit his purposes [in 352 BC], he went off to Thrace ...”, (‘First Olynthiac’, 1: 12-13).
   

The laurel crowns of 352 BC had not signalled any immediate danger for the Greeks, albeit that they had been given a warning of what was to come.  

Thrace (352 BC)

Thrace and the Cherosenes (ca. 353 BC)

Adapted from Nestoras Deligas (referenced below, Figure 5, at p. 74)

Prior Events

King Cotys I of Thrace died in 360 BC, shortly before Philip’s accession.  His son, Cersobleptes found himself facing two pretenders to the throne, Berisades and Amadocus.  The political intrigue that followed seems to have been orchestrated by two Greek mercenaries:

1. ✴Charidemus, who had been close to Cotys and then supported Cersobleptes; and
   

2. ✴Athenodorus, who supported Berisades. 
   

An Athenian named Aristocrates subsequently proposed a decree granting special protection for Charidemus, and this was opposed in the courts in 352 BC.  We learn from the speech that Demosthenes wrote for the proposer of this motion that:

1. “Berisades and Amadocus made a coalition; and Athenodorus, recognising a favourable opportunity, formed alliance with them, and so was in a position to make war.  Then Cersobleptes took fright, and Athenodorus proposed a convention, under which he compelled Cersobleptes to make a sworn agreement with [the Athenians and the other two] princes, [under which] the kingdom of Thrace should be held in common and divided among the three, and that they should all restore to [to the Athenians their] territory”, (‘Against Aristocrates’, 23: 170). 
   

When Cersobleptes reneged on this understanding, the Athenians sent Chares, one of their leading generals:

1. “... to the Chersonese  as plenipotentiary.  So Charidemus once more drafted a new convention with Chares, supported by Athenodorus and the [other] two kings”, (‘Against Aristocrates’, 23: 173). 
   

Part of this second agreement is recorded in a surviving inscription from Athens (translated by Peter Rhodes and Robin Osborne, referenced below, inscription 47, at pp. 234-7): in their commentary , they observed that:

1. ✴the kingdom was divided into three, with Berisades taking the west, Amadocus the centre and Cersobleptes the east (see the map above); and
   

2. ✴the three kings were regarded as joint rulers for some purposes, including their agreement to this alliance with Athens.
   

As we have seen Cetriporis, Berisades’ son and successor, had made an unsuccessful attempt to oppose Philip following his colonisation of Crenides/ Philippi in 365 BC. 

Philip in Thrace (352 BC)

As we have seen, Diodorus observed that, in ca. 355 BC:

“... Chares the Athenian general, sailed to the Hellespont, captured Sestos [on the Chersonese], killed its adult inhabitants and enslaved the rest.  And when Cersobleptes, son of Cotys, because of his hostility to Philip and his alliance of friendship with the Athenians, turned over all of the cities on the Chersonese except Cardia to the Athenians, who sent out cleruchs (settlers) to these cities”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 34: 4). 

Ian Worthington (referenced below, at p. 60) suggested that:

1. “Chares’ treatment of Sestos was meant to be a warning to Cersobleptes to adhere to the spirit of his ...  treaty with Athens [of 357 BC].  The warning might have been ignored, had it not been for Philip’s defeat at the hands of Onomarchus [in 353 BC]: for, when the news of this became known, Cersobleptes turned his back on Philip.”
   

This is probably why, when Philip turned back from Thermopylae in 352 BC, he headed for Thrace.

In construction from here

Olynthus

t

Thessaly

In 346 BC, Philip settled the wider Third Sacred War by diplomacy, which brought him effective control of the Delphic Amphictyony (a position of prestige rather than power).  As Carol King (referenced below, at p. 86) observed: 

“One of the first decisions of the Amphictyony, as a measure of [Philip’s] settlement of affairs, was to grant [him] the presidency of the Pythian games ... at Delphi in 346 BC.  Philip [duly] presided as the most powerful individual in the Greek world:

His new allies, the Athenians, did not welcome [these developments ... and] refused to attend the games. 

What the Macedonians of their king’s eminence the broader Greek world ...  [is unrecorded].” 

Athens

Demosthenes had also heard that the Thessalians:

1. “... will no longer hand over to [Philip] the profits of their harbours and markets, on the ground that this sum ought to be applied to the government of Thessaly and not find its way into Philip's coffers”, (‘First Olynthiac’, 1: 22).
   

This probably means that, although the Thessalians had agreed to allow Philip to use these funds for the purpose of commanding their joint army against the Phocians and their allies in the on-going ‘sacred war’, they (or at least some of them) were less enthusiastic about continuing these payments after he turned back at Thermopylae and headed for Thrace (see below).  This line of reasoning takes us to at least two difficult questions:

1. ✴what was Philip’s constitutional position in Thessaly once he left for Thrace; and
   

2. ✴did he take the Thessalian cavalry with him.
   

The short answer is that our surviving sources are silent on these matters.  However, it will be possible to make some educated guesses after discussing Philip’s actions when he returned his attention to Thessaly and the sacred war in 347 BC (see below).

1. ✴In an another speech that Demosthenes made shortly thereafter, he insisted that his fellow-Athenians:
   

2. “... must send an embassy to inform some of [the Thessalians] of our intentions [against Philip] and to stir up the others; for, they have already decided to demand the restoration of Pagasae and to protest against [Philip’s continued] occupation of Magnesia”, (‘Second Olynthiac’, 2: 11).
   

3. ✴The surviving text of a speech that was probably delivered in 343/2 BC, either by Demosthenes Hegesippus, records that Philip:
   

4. “... has robbed the Pheraeans of their city and placed a garrison in their citadel, in order, I suppose, to ensure their independence”, ‘On the Halonnesus’, 7: 32). 
   

5. ✴In a speech that Demosthenes made in 341 BC, he accused Philip of having:
   

6. “... robbed [the Thessalians] of their free constitutions and of their very cities [by] setting up tetrarchies in order to enslave them, not city by city, but tribe by tribe”, (‘Third Philippic’, 9: 26).
   

7. ✴Finally, in a speech that Demosthenes made in 330 BC, he alleged that:
   

8. “... men in the several cities who resemble Aeschines [i.e., they took bribes from Philip] ... cajoled and corrupted all the citizens within their grasp until they had reduced them to slavery.  So, [for example], the Thessalians were treated by [the tetrarchs] Daochus, Cineas, Thrasydaus ...”, (‘On the Crown’, 18: 294-5).
   

Demosthenes

1. “Do you imagine that, when [Philip] was expelling the [Thessalian] despots, or again when he was presenting them with Nicaea and Magnesia, they ever dreamed that:
   

2. ✴a decadarchy (council of ten) would be established among them, as it is today, or
   

3. ✴the same man who restored to them the Amphictyonic meeting at Thermopylae would also appropriate their own peculiar revenues?
   

4. ... But so it came to pass, as all men may know”, (‘Second Philippic’, 6: 22-3
   

1. ✴