Ivory head (4th century BC), usually thought to depict Philip II

from Tomb II at Aegae, now in the Polycentric Museum of Aigai (modern Vergina)

The image is from this article by Martin Anastasovski (2021) in the Macedonia Times 

In Construction

In 346 BC, Philip:

1. ✴secured a bilateral peace with the Athenians (the so-called Peace of Philocrates); and
   

2. ✴settled the wider Third Sacred War by diplomacy, which brought him effective control of the Delphic Amphictyony (a position of prestige rather than power).
   

As Carol King (referenced below, at p. 86) observed: 

1. “One of the first decisions of the Amphictyony, as a measure of [Philip’s] settlement of affairs, was to grant [him] the presidency of the Pythian games ... at Delphi in 346 BC.  Philip [duly] presided as the most powerful individual in the Greek world:
   

2. ✴His new allies, the Athenians, did not welcome [these developments ... and] refused to attend the games. 
   

3. ✴What the Macedonians of their king’s eminence the broader Greek world ...  [is unrecorded].”
   

Alexander

Olympias is the only one of Philip’s first five wives who is mentioned in our surviving sources after 346 BC, and she might have been the only one of them who remained at his court at that point.  Her son, Alexander of Macedonia, soon emerged as Philip’s favourite:

the Athenian politician Aeschines, in a speech that he in made 345 BC against a political rival, Timarchus), referred back to his own participation in an embassy to Philip’s court in the previous year (concerning the ratification of the Peace of Philocartes), during which:

“... at a certain banquet [that was presumably held in honour of the ambassadors, the boy Alexander played the cithara [and recited] certain passages ...”, (‘Against Timarchus’, 168); and

the tenor of a letter that Isocrates wrote to Alexander in 342 BC (when he was about 16) indicates that, by this time, he was treated as Philip’s likely heir.

Second Philippic (Hellenicaworld.com)

After settling affairs at Delphi in 346, Philip returned to

Macedonia. During a considerable part of 345 and in the early months of 344 he

was occupied with campaigns against the Illyrians, Dardani, and Triballi. But in

the summer (probably) of 344 he resumed his activities in Greece, garrisoning

Pherae and other towns of Thessaly with Macedonians, appropriating the revenues

derived from the Thessalian ports, and establishing oligarchical governments

throughout the country. At the same time negotiations were going on between

himself and Athens with regard to the Thracian strongholds which he had captured

in 346. He refused to give these up, though he offered to cut a canal across the

Chersonese, for the protection of the Athenian allies there from the attacks of

the Thracians. He also sent money and mercenaries to help the Messenians and

Argives, who, like the Megalopolitans, were anxious to secure their independence

of Sparta. Athens, which was on friendly terms with Sparta, sent envoys to the

Peloponnesian states to counteract Philip's influence, and of these Demosthenes

was one. In return, Argos and Messene complained to Athens of her interference

with their attempt to secure freedom, and Philip sent envoys to deprecate the

charges made against him by the Athenian ambassadors in the Peloponnese. He

pointed out that he had not broken any promises made to Athens at the time of

the Peace, for he had made none. (In fact, if Demosthenes' account is correct,

he had confined himself to vague expressions of goodwill; the promises had been

made by Aeschines.) The Second Philippic, spoken late in 344, proposes a reply

to Philip, the text of which has unfortunately not come down to us. The

Peloponnesian envoys appear also to have been in Athens at the time; and

Philip's supporters had put forward various explanations of his conduct at the

time when the Peace was made. To these also Demosthenes replies.

Adapted from Wikiwand 

Philip’s Plans to Invade Persian Asia Minor

By 346 BC, Isocrates had lost hope that that the Athenians would unify the Greeks and lead them against the Persians.  However, buoyed up by:

1. ✴Philip’s ratification of the bilateral treaty with Athens (which the Athenians termed the ‘Peace of Philocrates); and
   

2. ✴the peace that existed between the Greek poleis after the end of the ending of the Third Sacred War;
   

Isocrates published an open letter in which he urged Philip to:

1. “... undertake to:
   

2. ✴conquer the whole empire of the King [i.e., Artaxerxes III]; or
   

3. ✴at least, to take from it a vast extent of territory and seize the territory in Asia ‘from Cilicia to Sinope’ (to use a current expression).
   

4. ... If, however, you do not succeed in these objects, this much you will at any rate easily accomplish: the liberation of the [Greek] cities that are on the coast of Asia”, (‘To Philip’, 120-3, translated by George Norlin, referenced below, 1928, at pp. 319-21).
   

A passage by Diodorus Siculus implies that, in his opinion, Philip was already leaning in this direction:

1. “... after Philip had helped the Amphictyony to give effect to their decrees and had dealt courteously with all, he returned to Macedonia, having ... made important preparations for the aggrandisement that was destined to be his.  For he was ambitious to be designated general of Hellas in supreme command and, in this capacity, to prosecute the war against the Persians”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 60: 5).
   

It is possible that Diodorus was merely speculating here (with the benefit of hindsight) about Philip’s intentions. 

Philip and the Kingdom of Molossia 

At the time of Philip’s marriage to Olympias in 357 BC, her father, Neoplotemus was dead, and it was their uncle, King Arybbas, who arranged her marriage (since Philip was the enemy of his enemies, the Illyrians to the north).  However, the relationship between Philip and Arybbas seems to have broken down at about the time of his attack on Olynthus (350 BC), since Demosthenes, in a speech in which he  urged the Athenians to help Olynthus, he referred to Philip’s contemporary:

1. “... campaigns against Illyrians and Paeonians and King Arybbas ...:, (‘Olynthiac’, 1: 13).
   

As Ian Worthington (referenced below, 2008, at p. 70) observed, no details of what must have been a short war against Arybbas survive but it seems that Philip emerged victorious and that, although he allowed Arybbas to retain his throne, he transferred Olympias’ younger brother, Alexander of Molosssia, to his own court. 

Alexander of Molossia would have been educated with other well-bred young men at court (some of whom, like Alexander himself, would have been the young relatives of Philip’s allies).  According to Pompeius Trogus (whose work, written in ca. 20 AD, is known to us only through the epitome of it that Justinus produced about a century later): 

1. “When [Alexander] was 20, [Philip took the kingdom [of Molossia] from Arybbas and gave it [him] ...”, (‘Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' Philippic Histories’, 8: 6). 
   

Diodorus of Siculus recorded that, when: 

1. “... [Arybbas], king of the Molossians, died (sic) after a rule of ten years, leaving a son Aeacides ... , but Alexander, the brother of Olympias succeeded to the [Molossian] throne with the backing of Philip of Macedon”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 72: 1).
   

Arybbas was actually deposed on this occasion, but he did not die: instead, as Jessica Piccinini (referenced below, at pp. 471-2) pointed out, a surviving inscription indicates that, at this point, he:

1. “... renewed a long-established alliance [with the Athenians], reinforcing the pledge of mutual aid.  The opening lines of the [relevant] decree contain explicit mention of previous citizenship honours granted by the Athenians to [two earlier] members of the Molossian royal family, Arybbas’ father and grandfather (that is to say, Alcetas I and Tharyps)... “
   

The closing part of the Athenian inscription contains a threat that was clearly aimed at Philip: 

1. “... if anyone murders Arybbas, or any of the children of Arybbas, the penalties shall be the same as those that apply for other Athen citizens; and the [Athenian] generals in office shall ensure that Arybbas and his children recover their ancestral rule.”
   

Ian Worthington (referenced below, 2008, at pp. 116-7), suggested that, in 343 BC, when Philip’s relations with Athens were deteriorating:

1. “... Ayrbbas may have been taking steps to ensure the continuation of his rule [in Molossia by making] overtures to the Athenians ... At the best of times, Philip could not allow any form of insurrection to his south-west, but especially not now, with [his current peace agreement with Athens] looking shakier every day.  Thus, [he] decided:
   

2. ✴to invade Epirus [in order] to secure his south-western border once and for all; and
   

3. ✴to stall any Athenian military support for Arybbas [by diplomatic means].”
   

It seems that his timing was impeccable:

1. ✴he quickly deposed Arybbas in what seems to have been a bloodless campaign; and
   

2. ✴although the Athenians provided Arybbas with a safe place of exile, they did nothing to implement their promise to use force on his behalf in order to recover his throne.  
   

At this point, the territory of Molossia did not extend as far as the coast.  However, as Adolfo Domínguez (referenced below, 2015, at p. 112) pointed out:

1. “In the [pseudo]-Demosthenes’ oration ‘On the Halonnesus’ (at 7: 32), written and perhaps delivered in 343/2 BC, the hostile actions carried out by Philip II ... are enumerated, among them that [he]: 
   

2. ‘... advanced with his army on Ambracia, razed and scorched the territory of the three poleis of Cassopaea: Pandosia, Boucheta and Elateia [marked on the map above], ... and, [after] taking those cities by force, he handed them over to Alexander [of Molossia], his brother-in-law, to be his slaves’.
   

3. It is highly probable that this action took place at the same time as his [deposition of Arybbas] ...”
   

Adrian Goldsworthy (referenced below, at p. 190) observed that Philip’s specific:

1. “... aim was to secure Epirus’ border and to enrich [Alexander’s] kingdom, [since] these cities ... controlled the maritime trade to and from the wider world.” 
   

In short, by his surprise attack on Arybbas’ territory and the coastal cities to the south of it, Philip:

1. ✴improved the military value of the region between Macedonia and the sea as a bulwark against Ambracia and Athens; and
   

2. ✴ensured that it was in the hands of a king on whom he could rely. 
   

When Demosthenes had whipped up the Athenians against Philip in 341 BC, he had pointed out, inter alia, that:

1. “... the Corinthians [had been] hit by his invasion of [the Corinthian colonies of] Ambracia and Leucas”, (‘Third Philippic”, 9: 34);
   

As Michael Dixon (referenced below, at p. 16) pointed out:

1. “Demosthenes is precise about neither the nature of [Philip’s] attack [on] Ambracia and Leucas] nor its outcome, although evidence suggests that [at this point], he captured neither.”
   

It seems likely that, at this point, Philip did not press his campaign as far as Ambracia itself because he wanted to maintain his uneasy peace with Athens a little time longer.

To sum up, it seems that, in 343 BC, Philip:

1. ✴deposed King Arybbas of Molossia, who took refuge in Athens;
   

2. ✴installed his own brother-in-law, Alexander, on the Molossian throne  and extended its territory by the addition of the coastal cities of Pandosia, Boucheta and Elateia; but
   

3. ✴stopped short of taking Ambracia, probably in order to retain his precarious peace with Athens for a little time longer.
   

As we shall see, Alexander of Molossia was to remain faithful to Philip for the remainder of Philip’s reign.

Philip in Thrace (342-340 BC)

Having secured his southern border, Philip  marched against two of the kingdoms of Thrace (those of Cersebleptes and Teres III).  Meanwhile, an Athenian commander, Diopeithes, who had been set to the Chersonese to support Athenian colonists there, entered into a border dispute with the Thracian settlement of Cardia, which  enjoyed Philip’s protection.  This and other hostile actions prompted Philip to send a formal letter of protest to Athens, presumably demanding that Diopeithes should be recalled.  Demosthenes (in a speech that he made in 341 BC in support of Diopeithes - see below) observed that: 

1. “... that man [i.e., Philip] has been out of sight  for 10 months, cut off from all chance of returning home by disease, by winter, and by war”, (‘On the Chersonese’, 35-36). 
   

Thus, Philip had spent the winter of 342/1 BC in Thrace, and had not found things there as easy as he might have expected.

Demosthenes (who, by this time, was almost obsessive in his opposition to Philip) argued that Philip’s real objectives in protesting to the Athenians about Diopeithes’ actions was to ensure:

1. “... that you should stay at home, with no Athenian force in field, while Philip ... settles everything to his own advantage.  For, you must first note what is going on at the present moment: he is now established in Thrace with a large force, and is sending for considerable reinforcements from Macedonia and Thessaly, according to [our agents] on the spot. 
   

2. ✴Now, if he should wait for the Etesian winds to blow and [then] march to the siege of Byzantium, do you think that the Byzantines will remain in their present state of infatuation [with him] and will not  ... demand your help? ... [Of course they will:
   

3. •even if they distrusted [another potential saviour] more than [they now distrust] us, they would [still] let them in, rather than hand over the city to Philip .... ; but
   

4. •if we cannot sail from Athens, and if there is no force ready to help them on the spot, [the Byzantines’] doom is sealed.
   

5. [You say that they deserve that fate].  Quite so, but still we are bound to preserve them in the interests of Athens.  
   

6. ✴Furthermore, we cannot be sure that he will not attack the Chersonese.  Indeed, if we may judge from the letter which he sent you, he means to take vengeance on the [Athenian] settlers there:
   

7. •If, our present force is still stationed there, it will be able both to save the Chersonese and to make raids upon Philip's territory.
   

8. •However, if we recall it, what shall we do if he marches against the Chersonese?
   

9. [We must decide between two courses of action]:
   

10. ✴to defend ourselves here and let the war spread to Attica; or
    

11. ✴to contrive some employment for him elsewhere?
    

12. I prefer the latter”, (‘On the Chersonese’, 13-18). 
    

The fact that the Athenians accepted Demosthenes’ advice illustrates the fragile nature of the putative state of peace between Philip and Athens.  The extract of the speech reproduced here illustrates that:

1. ✴Philip had sent for reinforcement in 341 BC, presumably because the military situation in Thrace was more challenging than he has expected;
   

2. ✴Demosthenes was able to play on Athenian concerns that, should Philip succeed in Thrace, he would then march on the Greek settlements in the Chersonese and on Byzantium, thereby threatening the Athenians’ supply lines through the Hellespont; and
   

3. ✴his advice was that, rather than reduce their forces in the Chersonese, the Athenians should reinforce them and be prepared to defend Byzantium, while simultaneously contriving to exacerbate Philip’s military problems in Thrace.
   

Diodorus Siculus seems to have been unaware of Philip’s difficulties in this campaign: he simply recorded that:

1. “In Macedonia, Philip conceived a plan to win over the Greek cities in Thrace to his side, and marched into that region.  Cersobleptes, who was the king of the Thracians, had been following a policy of reducing the Hellespontine cities bordering on his territory and of ravaging their territories.  With the aim of putting a stop to the barbarian attacks Philip moved against them with a large force.  He overcame the Thracians in several battles and imposed on the conquered barbarians the payment of a tithe to the Macedonians, and by founding strong cities at key places made it impossible for the Thracians to commit any outrages in the future.   So the Greek cities [of Thrace] were freed from this fear and gladly joined Philip's alliance”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 71: 1-2).
   

While it is clear that Philip did eventually gain control  of Thrace, it seems that this phase of his invasion did not end until the summer of 340 BC, when (as we shall see) he marched on Perinthus.

Philip and Athens (340 - 339 BC) 

As Ian Worthington (referenced below, 2013, at p. 214) observed:

1. “The Athenians were extremely alarmed by Philip’s acquisition of Thrace and the fact that his sphere of influence now reached almost to the Hellespont.”
   

This concern arose because the cities of the Hellespont controlled the sea lanes that were used to bring grain from the Black Sea to the Aegean.  

Philip’s Arrival at Cardia

As we have seen, Cardia, on the boundary of Thrace proper and the Chersonese, was already a potential flashpoint.  We know from an Athenian  inscription (IG II3 309) dated to the archonship of Nichomacos (341/0 BC) that the experienced general Chares had replaced Diopeithes by that time: the inscription records that:

1. “What the People have decreed for the Chersonesians is [also] to apply also to the Elaeousians [the people of  Elaeus, on the southern tip of the Chersonese], and the general Chares is to take care of them in the same way, so that [they] may possess what is theirs and live on a fair and just basis with the Athenians in the Chersonese.”
   

The Elaeusians were long-standing Athenian allies, and this decree effectively gave them the same rights as the Athenian cleruchs (settlers) in the region.  The facts that, in 341/0 BC, the Athenians had:

1. ✴sent Chares to the region; and
   

2. ✴given this honour to the people of the strategically-located Elaeus;
   

suggest that they expected Philip to appear in the region, ostensibly to aid the Cardians in their border dispute with the cleruchs. 

Philip’s Letter to the Athenians 

According to Nicholas Hammond (referenced below), the surviving text of a letter headed ‘Philip to the Council and People of Athens’ that is preserved in the corpus of Demosthenes’ work (as ‘Demosthenes’, 12) is:

1. ✴probably authentic (p. 13);  and
   

2. ✴reproduced in the surviving manuscripts largely as Philip wrote it (p. 15).
   

In this letter, Philip first rehearsed the catalogue of alleged Athenian breaches of the Peace of Philocrates over the preceding period.  Interestingly, he charged (inter alia) that:

1. “... you have shown your contempt for right and your hostility to me by actually sending an embassy to urge the king of Persia, [Artaxerxes III], to declare war on me.  This is the most amazing exploit of all, since:
   

2. ✴before the king reduced Egypt and Phoenicia, you passed a decree calling on me to make common cause with the rest of the Greeks against him, in case he attempted to interfere with us; while
   

3. ✴today, such is your hatred for me that you negotiate with him for a defensive alliance [against me]”, (‘Philip’s Letter’, 12: 6-7).
   

This alleged provocation seems to have been very recent, but Philip claimed that the situation had since deteriorated, to the extent that:

1. “Our mutual hostility has become so acute that, when I wanted to convey my fleet to the Hellespont, I was compelled to escort it with my army through the Chersonese, because:
   

2. ✴your cleruchs there were at war with us, ... backed up by your resolutions; and
   

3. ✴your general, [Chares], was inciting the Byzantines and publicly announcing that your orders were that he should make war on me if the opportunity arose”, (‘Philip’s Letter’, 12: 16).
   

Nicholas Hammond (as above) argued that this letter was set to the Athenians:

1. ✴after Philip had arrived at Cardia (in June 340 BC - see p. 18); and
   

2. ✴before Byzantium sent any help to Perinthus (p. 17 - see below). 
   

More precisely, since Perinthus itself is not mentioned, the letter presumably also preceded Philip’s assault of that city (in July, 340 BC - see p. 17).  If this scenario is accepted, then we have Philip’s justification for his actions after his arrival at Cardia in June/July 340 BC.

Philip’s closing remarks read like a declaration of war: 

1. “Such are the complaints I have to make:
   

2. ✴You were the aggressors [in the recent past] and (thanks to my forbearance) you are still  attacking my interests and doing me all the harm in your power.
   

3. ✴I shall [therefore]:
   

4. •defend myself, with justice on my side; and
   

5. •calling the gods to witness, bring my dispute with you to an issue”, (‘Philip’s Letter’, 12: 23).
   

Demosthenes, in the speech to the Athenians in which he reacted to this letter, opened by observing that: 

1. “It must now be clear to all of you, Athenians, that Philip never concluded a peace with you, but only postponed the war; ... [For years now], he has been  ... practically at war with Athens, although it is only now that he confesses it openly in the letter that he has sent”, (‘Answer to Philip's Letter’, 11: 1).
   

(However, as we shall see, it seems that the Athenians did not formally repudiate the Peace of Philocrates until the following year.)

Chares and Byzantium

We should return now to Philip’s complaint that:

1. “... when I wanted to convey my fleet to the Hellespont, I was compelled to escort it with my army through the Chersonese, because:
   

2. ✴your cleruchs there were at war with us, ... backed up by your resolutions; and
   

3. ✴your general, [Chares], was inciting the Byzantines and publicly announcing that your orders were that he should make war on me if the opportunity arose”, (‘Philip’s Letter’, 12: 16).
   

This indicates that he had had to lead his army along the coast from Cardia to the Hellespont in order to protect his fleet from the cleruchs as it circumnavigated the Chersonese peninsula.  Nicholas Hammond (referenced below, at p. 16) argued that Philip:

1. “... probably came at night to Cardia.  Since it is just over 30 miles from Cardia to the tip of the Chersonese, as the crow flies, his army and fleet could have covered that stretch in a day. ... The next day was the critical one: if Chares had mustered the bulk of his fleet within the Hellespont and was ready to engage Philip's fleet, the Macedonian army could not help the Macedonian warships.  [Since Philip did not complain in his letter that Chares himself had done anything to obstruct his arrival in the Hellespont] it is evident that Chares
   

2. ✴was either not there with his fleet; or
   

3. ✴... [for whatever reason, chose not to] engage ...”
   

The following passage by Plutarch might throw some light on the reason for this: he recorded that:

1. “... Philip ... went to the Hellespont with all his forces, expecting to take the Chersonese, along with Perinthus and Byzantium, into his power.  The Athenians were eager to give aid to their allies, and their orators [presumably Demosthenes and his supporters] strove successfully to have Chares sent out as commander.  However, after he arrived there, he did nothing worthy of the force at his command.  Furthermore, the cities even refused to receive his armament into their harbours.  [He therefore] wandered about, exacting money from the allies and despised by the enemy ...”, (‘Life of Phocion’, 14: 2-5).
   

It is possible that Plutarch treated Chares unfairly here (in order to add lustre to the subsequent performance of Phocian, who was the subject of this biography).  Thus, while it is likely that the Byzantines were reluctant to allow Chares to  enter their harbours, this might not have been simply because of Chares’ comportment.  After all:

1. ✴as John Ellis (referenced below, at p. 35 and note 14) pointed out, in 352 BC, both the Byzantines and the Perinthians had joined Philip in his attack on the Thracian King Cersebleptes (then allied with Athens); and
   

2. ✴as Demosthenes noted (in ‘On the Chersonese’, 14 - see above), in 341 BC, they were still well disposed towards Philip and heartily distrusted the Athenians, who represented a clear and present danger to their independence.
   

Thus, the Byzantines would have had had no reason to treat with the Athenians, at least until  Philip suddenly arrived ‘on their doorstep’ in the summer of 340 BC.   Thus, it is possible that, when Philip suddenly arrived in the Hellespont, Chares chose not to confront him because there was a real possibility that the Byzantines would sail south to his support.  Instead, as we shall see, it seems that crossed the Bosporus to Hieron, where the vulnerable Athenian grain fleet was anchored.

Philip’s Assault on Perinthus

According to Diodorus Siculus, in 340 BC:

1. “Philip ... made an expedition against Perinthus, which had resisted him and inclined toward the Athenians”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 74: 2). 
   

However, as Richard Gabriel (referenced below, at p. 191) observed:

1. “There is no evidence in any [surviving] Athenian speeches of a rapprochement between Athens and Perinthus.”
   

He argued that Philip needed both Perinthus and Byzantium in order to complete his subjugation of Thrace.  He pointed out that these cities, which controlled access to both the Hellespont and the Bosporus, would be of great strategic value in any future contest between Philip on the one hand and Persia and/or Athens on the other.  However, that does not answer two important questions: why act now, and why start with Perinthius?  I will leave the discussion of the first of these questions for a later section: for the moment, I suggest only that Philip decided to attack Perinthus because he still believed that the Byzantines would remain faithful to ‘the devil they knew’.  However, if so, then he was about to discover his miscalculation.

Diodorus recorded that, faced with stubborn resistance at Perinthus, Philip laid siege to it and:

1. “... assailed [its] walls in relays day after day ... [However]:
   

2. ✴although the Perinthians’ daily losses were heavy, they received reinforcements of men, missiles and artillery from Byzantium ... ; [and]
   

3. ✴[under instruction form] the Persian king ... his satraps on the coast to give them all possible assistance ... [they duly sent] a force of mercenaries, ample funds and sufficient stocks of food, missiles and other materials required for operations.
   

4. ... [Once thus support had arrived, the Perinthian and Macedonian] armies were again well matched”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 74:2 -75:2)
   

Demosthenes, in his ‘Answer to Philip's Letter’ (mentioned above), in which he tried (successfully as it turned out) to persuade the Athenians to attack Philip, encouraged his audience by observing that:

1. “... quite recently, the satraps of Asia Minor sent a force of mercenaries and compelled Philip to raise the siege of Perinthus (sic); but ... if he reduces Byzantium, the danger is at their very doors, and not only will they eagerly join the war against him but they will also prompt the king of Persia to become our paymaster and  ... [history tells us that], whichever side he joined, he ensured their victory,  Therefore, if  he sides with us now, he will easily crush the power of Philip”, ( ‘Answer to Philip's Letter’, 11: 5-6).
   

This confirms the suggestion above that Chares did not initially engage with Philip because he had yet to receive orders to that effect from Athens.

Finally, Diodorus recorded that, at some point, Philip became frustrated by his lack of progress at Perinthus and therefore decided to:

1. “... split his forces in two, [leaving one force to continue the operations before Perinthus while he led the other to besiege Byzantium]”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 76: 2-3).
   

Demosthenes had a different (but possibly compliment of Philip’s decision to besiege Byzantium: he claimed that, when Philip marched towards Cardia:

1. “... the first thing he did was to claim the help of the Byzantines as his allies in the war against [Athens].  When they refused, declaring with entire truth that the terms of [their] alliance [with him] included no such obligation, he ... began a siege [of their city]”, (‘On the Crown’, 18: 87-8)
   

Although the Byzantines had already sent ‘men, missiles and artillery] to Perinthus, they had retained sufficient resources with which to hold Philip at bay (as we shall see).  

Philip’s Capture of the Athenian Fleet

According to Didymos, in his comments on Demosthenes’ ‘Answer to Philip's Letter’ (see above), recorded that:

1. “The war of the Athenians against Philip was ignited by all Philip’s  ... [many offences] while he was pretending to be at peace [with Athens], but especially by his expedition against Byzantium and Perinthus.  He was ambitious to bring these cities over to his side for two reasons:
   

2. ✴to deprive the Athenians of their grain supply; and
   

3. ✴to ensure that they might not have coastal cities to provide bases for their fleet and places of refuge for the war against him. 
   

4. [It was while he had both of these cities under siege that] he perpetrated his most lawless act, by seizing the Athenian grain ships that were at Hieron, [opposite Byzantium, on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorous]: the number of Greek vessels was] 230 according to Philochoros or 180 according to Theopompos; and from these he gathered 700 talents.  ... According to Philochoros, ... Chares, [who was responsible for the protection of the merchant fleet at Hieron], had:
   

5. ‘... sailed away to a gathering of the [Artaxerxes’] generals, leaving warships at Hieron to see to the marshalling of the vessels from the Pontus.  Philip, observing that Chares was not present, initially tried to send his warships to seize the transports.  However, when this failed, he used his ships to land his soldiers at Hieron and [they were able to capture the Athenian merchant fleet].  In total, there were no fewer than 230 vessels.  Judging these to be prizes of war, Philip broke them up and used the timbers for his siege-engines.  In addition, he took possession of grain and hides and a great amount of money’", (‘On Demosthenes’, 10:34-11.5, based on the translations of Alfonso Moreno, referenced below, at p. T22, p. 689 and Philip Harding, referenced below, at pp. 79-81, with notes at pp. 210-215).
   

Alfonso Moreno (referenced below, at p. 668) argued that:

1. “The reason why Chares was away was probably the same one that made Hieron the appropriate site for the marshalling of convoys of merchantmen ... : it was the status of Hieron as a sanctuary, giving it (and any who stopped there) a divine guarantee of inviolability ... Chares apparently did not expect Philip, a man notoriously sensitive to the public observance of religious procedure ... , to commit blatant sacrilege by violating the sanctuary.  This reasoning seems to lie behind Didymos’ description of the seizure as Philip’s ‘most lawless act’ ... .” 
   

Pompeius Trogus (as epitomised by Justinus) gave a shorter  account of these events in which he suggested that Philip had decided to take Byzantium as a prelude an invasion of Greece and opportunistically captured the Athenian grain fleet in order to raise money towards this grand design:  

1. “Philip ... resolved to make war upon the whole of Greece ... [and decided to start on this plan by taking] possession of Byzantium, a noble city and seaport that would serve as a base for his forces by land and sea.  Since it shut its gates against him, he laid siege to it.. ... [However, when the Byzantines] maintained their liberty with the greater determination, Philip resorted to piracy for a supply of money, and, having captured 270 ships and sold off the cargoes, he was enabled for a while to relieve his craving wants”, (‘Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' Philippic Histories’, 9: 1: 1-6)
   

Interestingly, Demosthenes did not mention this seizure of the grain fleet in his speech reacting to Philip’s letter, presumably because he had yet to become aware of it.  However, in a later speech in which he defended his record in office, he asserted that:

1. “The peace was broken [in 340 BC], not by Athens, but by Philip, when he seized those [Athenian] merchantmen ... [Look at] the decrees and Philip's letter: [if you read] them in their proper order, they will show who was responsible for each several proceedings:
   

2. Decree: In the archonship of Neocles [sic: Theophrastus was archon in 340/39 BC], in the month Boedromion, at an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly convened by the generals, Eubulus, son of Mnesitheus, of Coprus, proposed that:
   

3. -since the generals have announced in the assembly that the admiral Leodamas and the 20 ships under his command that were sent to the Hellespont to convoy corn have been removed to Macedon by Philip's officer, Amyntas, and are there kept in custody:
   

4. -it shall be the concern of the presidents and of the generals that the Council be convened and ambassadors chosen to go to Philip and that, on their arrival, they shall confer with him about the seizure of the admiral and the ships and the soldiers ... ,
   

5. [If the ambassadors find that the  Macedonians’ actions were] a deliberate affront ... ,  they shall state the same, in order that the [Athenian] people, being apprised of it, may decide what course to take”, (‘On the Crown’, 18: 73-4)
   

Assuming that this text actually does reflect the contents of an authentic decree, then it would seem that the Athenians did not respond immediately on receiving the news of the fate of their fleet.  However, at some point shortly thereafter, respond they did: Dionysius of Halicarnassus recorded that, in 340 BC, the stele recording the Peace of Philocrates:

1. “... was broken.  The Athenians blamed Philip for starting the war, while Philip accused the Athenians.  The reasons why each of the two sides embarked upon the war and claimed to be the injured party, and the date when they violated the peace, are indicated precisely by Philochorus in the 6th Book of his ‘Attic History’, from which I shall quote the essential facts:
   

2. ‘[In 340 BC], Philip first sailed up and attacked Perinthus and, failing there, went next to lay siege to Byzantium, and brought siege-engines against it.’
   

3. Then he [i.e., Philochorus] describes in full the allegations that Philip made against the Athenians in his letter, and adds these words, which I quote as they stand:
   

4. ‘The people, after listening to the letter [itself] the speech [that Demosthenes made in reaction to it, in which he] exhorted them to declare war and [then] proposed the usual measures, voted to: 
   

5. ✴demolish the stele that had been set up to record the treaty of peace and alliance with Philip; and
   

6. ✴man a fleet and prepare for war’”, (‘First Letter to Ammaeus’, 11, translated by Stephen Usher, referenced below, at pp. 333-5).
   

Relief of Byzantium (339 BC)

Diodorus Siculus recorded that, in early 339 BC, when:

1. “... Philip was [still] besieging [Perinthus and] Byzantium, the Athenians voted that he had broken his treaty with them and promptly dispatched a formidable fleet to aid [the Byzantines.  Chios, Cos and Rhodes] also sent reinforcements.  Philip, who was frightened by this joint action, broke off the siege of the two cities, and made a treaty of peace with the Athenians and their Greek allies”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 77: 2-3).
   

As Carol King(referenced below, at p. 92 and note 185) observed, Diodorus’ final sentence here is inaccurate:

1. “We do not know what terms Philip came to with the Byzantines and the Perinthians, but he certainly did not make peace with Athens while the shattered fragments of Philocrates’ stele were still settling in the dust.” 
   

If the decree reproduced in the corpus of the works of Demosthenes (at (‘On the Crown’, 18: 90-1) is authentic, then both the Byzantines and the Perinthians considered that they owed their salvation to the Athenians. Plutarch provided some information on their putative role in these events: he identified Phocion as the leader of:

1. “...  another [naval] force [that the Athenians sent to the Hellespont after the loss of the merchant fleet], a commission that contributed more than anything else to the salvation of Byzantium: Phocion was held in high repute there and ... [the Byzantines duly] threw open their gates and received the Athenians [as allies].  ... In this way Philip was expelled from the Hellespont  ... Moreover, Phocion captured some of [Philip’s] ships and recovered cities that he had garrisoned.  He also landed in many parts of Philip's territory and plundered and overran it, until he was wounded by those who rallied to its defence, and sailed back home”, (‘Life of Phocion’, 14: 2-5).
   

It is interesting to note that, although the Persians had sent help to the Perinthians in the previous year, there is nothing in our surviving sources to suggest that they supplied any help to the besieged Byzantines. 

Stephanus of Byzantium

Getia is the genitive form from which the proper name (Getes, Geta) <comes>.  It is <given to> a Thracian people.

There is also the feminine T'eris (getidine); for such was the name of the wife of Philip, son of Amyntas.

And as Ktetikon Γετικός (getic) is used, from which the Gefika of Crito (FGrHist 200 T 1) <have their title>, and as feminine Γετική.

Customs of the Getae are to sacrifice the <favorite> woman to the man <after his death> and to play the kithara when heralds make announcements.

But Arrian (FGrHist 156 F 113) calls them Getener

Persian Response

Artaxerxes III can hardly have been indifferent to the fact that the Macedonians and the Athenians were on the verge of war on his eastern border.  Furthermore, as we have seen:

1. ✴before Philip had entered the Hellespont, he had intelligence which suggested that the Athenians had sent an embassy to Artaxerxes, urging him to take their side; and
   

2. ✴as Diodorus recorded, when Philip attacked Perinthus, Artaxerxes instructed his satraps on the coast of Asia Minor to provide he Perinthians with both men and supplies. 
   

As we shall see, Philochorus recorded that, when Philip subsequently attacked the Athenian grain fleet at Hieron, Chares was away, attending  ‘a gathering of [Artaxerxes’] generals’.  Thus, it seems likely that it was Philip’s arrival in the Hellespont and his siege of Perinthus precipitated the realignment that left him facing opposition from the Perinthians, the Byzantines, the Atheniand and a number of Persian satraps, all of whom had a vested interest in the stability of the sea lanes  from the Black Sea to the Aegean.

In the early spring of 339 BC Philip launched one last assault on the walls, using the spring moonlight to aid a night attack. The barking of dogs was said to have betrayed the attack, and Philip decided to give up and retreat. His biggest problem was that his fleet was trapped in the Black Sea by an Athenian force that held the Bosporus.

Philip resorted to a simple trick to get his fleet to safety. He sent a letter to Antipater, informing him that Thrace was in revolt, and his garrisons under siege. Antipater was ordered to join Philip as he marched into Thrace to restore control. The Athenians relaxed their guard in the Bosporus, or possibly withdrew their fleet from the area, allowing Philip to get his own fleet out of the Black Sea.

Alexander of Macedonia in 340 BC

Plutarch recorded that: 

1. “While Philip was making an expedition against Byzantium [in 340 BC], Alexander, [his son by Olympias], although only 16 years old, was left behind as regent in Macedonia and keeper of the royal seal,  During this time he subdued the rebellious Maedoi [in Thrace] and, after taking their city, drove out [its inhabitants], settled there a mixed population, and named the city Alexandropolis”, (‘Life of Alexander’, 9: 1).
   

She linked this to a passage in a speech that Demosthenes delivered in 341 BC, in which he gloated that:

1. “... the [unnamed] agent, [possibly Hermias of Atarneus, see Anton-Hermann Chroust, referenced below], who was privy to all Philip's schemes against [Artaxerxes III] has been kidnapped, and [Artaxerxes] will hear of all these plots:
   

2. ✴not as the complaint of Athenians, whom he might suspect of speaking for our own private advantage, but
   

3. ✴from the lips of the very man who planned and carried them out”, (‘Philippics 4’, 32).
   

Thus, it seems that

In 338 BC, King Philip II of Macedonia defeated a coalition of Greek cities led by Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea  in 338 BC, thus paving the way for an explosion of Macedonian/ Greek  power around the eastern Mediterranean.

Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC) 

As Max Goldman (referenced below, at p. 123) observed:

1. “For years, the orator Demosthenes [had] urged the Athenians to oppose the rising power of Macedon, which had come to prominence in the 2nd half of the 4th century BC through the diplomatic and military efforts of its king, Philip II.  Demosthenes [had] finally convinced the Athenians and the Thebans to form  [the] alliance [that] faced Philip at Chaeronea in the late summer of 338 BC.”
   

As noted above, the Athenians and their allies suffered a disastrous defeat of this battle.  Nevertheless, in 336 BC, the Athenians accepted a proposal by the orator Ctesiphon that they should honour Demosthenes for his many services to the city by presenting him with a golden crown.  However, sentiment towards Demosthenes had changed by 330 BC, and Ctesiphon found himself facing prosecution for having acted illegally in this matter.  In effect: 

1. ✴Ctesiphon’s trial was really an attack Demosthenes’ entire career; and
   

2. ✴Demosthene’s  speech, ostensibly in Ctesiphon’s defence, was really a robust defence of his own actions in office.  
   

Of interest in the present context is what Demosthenes said about the Athenian preparations ahead of the Battle of Chaeronea:

1. “For resources, [we] possessed:
   

2. ✴the islanders (but ... only the weakest of them, for neither Chios, nor Rhodes, nor Corcyra was on our side);
   

3. ✴a subsidy of 45 talents, all collected in advance; and
   

4. ✴not a single private or trooper apart from our own army.
   

5. But, what was most alarming  ... [was the fact that my political opponents] had made all our neighbours (the Megarians, the Thebans and the Euboeans) more inclined to enmity than to friendship [towards us. ... Whenever my opponents] had the advantage of me (and, for one reason or another, that often happened), [they] laid your plans for the enemy's benefit and went [their] ways.  In spite of all these drawbacks, I made alliances for you with:
   

6. ✴the Euboeans;
   

7. ✴the Achaeans;
   

8. ✴the Corinthians;
   

9. ✴the Thebans;
   

10. ✴the Megarians;
    

11. ✴the Leucadians; and
    

12. ✴the Corcyraeans.
    

13. [These states provided] a foreign division of 15,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, not counting their citizen-soldiery.  I also obtained from them, in money, the largest subsidy I could”, (‘On the Crown’, 18: 234-8).
    

However, Diodorus Siculus (‘Library of History’, 16: 86 7), our only detailed source for the course of the subsequent battle, mentioned only the Athenian and the Thebans/ Boeotian armies.

The course of this battle is described in the excellent webpage of Livius entitled ‘Chaeronea (338 BCE)’:

1. “It seems that the right wing of the Macedonian army slowly moved backwards, and that the Athenians (on the Greek left wing) moved forwards.  This created a gap in the Greek lines, [so that] the Athenians lost contact with the Thebans on the Greek right wing.  When this gap opened, [Philip’s young son], Alexander, who commanded the Macedonian left, charged and broke through. He attacked the Greek right wing, which was occupied by the famous ‘Sacred Band’ of the Thebans, who were massacred.  This was the end of the battle and the beginning of the spectacular military career of Alexander.”
   

This probably over-states Alexander’s contribution: the strategist Polyaenus (quoted in this webpage), in a passage that is usually assumed to relate to this battle,  understood that Philip had:

1. ✴staged the Macedonian retreat in order to isolate the Theban hoplites; and
   

2. ✴positioned his left wing (which might have been commanded by Alexander) in a good position from which to overwhelm them.
   

What is certain is that Alexander had acquitted himself well during the battle, although, as we shall see, he might also have let this early success go to his head. 

Diodorus Siculus recorded that:

1. “More than 1,000 Athenians fell in the battle and no less than 2,000 were captured.  Likewise, many of the Boeotians were killed and not a few taken prisoner”,  (‘Library of History’, 16: 86: 6). 
   

Plutarch noted that: 

1. “It is said that the Theban Sacred Band was never beaten until the battle of Chaeroneia, and that, when Philip was surveying the dead after the battle, he stopped at the  place where the 300 were lying, all where they had faced the long spears of his phalanx ... and mingled one with another.  He was amazed and, on learning that this was the band of lovers and beloved, he burst into tears and said: 
   

2. ‘May those who think that these men did or suffered anything disgraceful perish miserably’”, (‘Life of Pelopidas’, 18: 5)
   

Aftermath

According to Aelian (ca. 200 AD):

1. “When Philip won the battle of Chaeronea  ... [the Greek] cities (Thebes, Megara, Corinth, the Achaeans, Elis, Euboea and the whole of Acte [presumably Attica]) surrendered individually”, (‘Historical Miscellany’, 6: 1, translated by Nigel Wilson, referenced below, at p. 231).
   

Carl Roebuck (referenced below, at p. 73 and note 1) observed that, although this is the most detailed surviving source for Philip’s negotiation of  bilateral treaties, it contains a number of omissions, most notably Athens (see below).  

According to Pompeius Trogus (as epitomised by Justinus): 

1. “To the Athenians (whom [Philip] had found to be his bitterest enemies), he returned their prisoners without ransom and released the bodies of the dead for burial, exhorting them to convey the relics of their dead to the sepulchres of their ancestors. He also sent his son Alexander and ... [the experienced diplomat] Antipater to Athens, to establish peace and friendship with the Athenians”, (‘Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' Philippic Histories’, 7: 9: 4-5). 
   

According to Diodorus of Siculus, when the Athenian Demades, who had been taken prisoner addressed Philip: 

1. “... with Attic charm, [Philip responded] by releasing all of the Athenian prisoners without ransom, ..., sent envoys to the Athenians and concluded with them a treaty of friendship and alliance”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 87: ).
   

Carl Roebuck (referenced below, at pp. 81-2) observed that:

1. “Philip's considerate behaviour in returning the [Athenian] prisoners without ransom and in sending back the bones of the dead helped to influence the Athenians to accept the terms that Demades proposed to the assembly.  The terms of the [resulting] treaty have to be pieced together from various sources; but it is clear that ... they were designed to destroy the real power of [Athens], although allowing it ... [some] outward signs of independence.  The strength of Athens had, of course, lain in its naval supremacy and control of key points in the Aegean and in the Thracian Chersonese.  Accordingly, the [Athenian] confederacy was dissolved, but the city itself retained full independence and the control of certain islands (Lemnos, Samos, Skyros, Imbros and Delos) ... [and] no Macedonian forces entered Athenian territory ... In addition, there was no purge of anti-Macedonians: ... [thus, for example], Demosthenes pronounced the funeral oration over the Athenian dead [after their remains were returned to the city].  The treaty also stipulated that the Athenians would be allowed to enter Philip's proposed league [see below] ... Thus, on the whole, Athens received very generous treatment ...” 
   

This doubtlessly reflected the fact that Philip would need Athenian support and resources (notably, its naval resources) in order  to proceed with his planned invasion of Asia Minor (see below). 

The situation of Thebes was very different: as Carl Roebuck (referenced below, at p. 77) observed, it must have been obvious to Philip that: 

1. “... if central Greece was to be [rendered] quiescent, the power of Thebes would have to be destroyed.”
   

Thus, while Diodorus Siculus simply noted (almost in passing) that Philip:

1. “... concluded peace with the Boeotians, but maintained a garrison in Thebes”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 87: 3); 
   

Pompeius Trogus (as epitomised by Justinus) gave a fuller account:  Philip

1. “... compelled the Thebans to pay for the return of  their prisoners and the liberty of burying their dead.  He also executed some of the chief men of the city and banished others, seizing upon the property of them all.  Afterwards, he reinstated  ... those that had been unjustly banished from their city ... ”, (‘Epitome of Pompeius Trogus' Philippic Histories’, 7: 9: 6-8). 
   

As Paul Cartledge, referenced below, at p. 189) observed:

1. “The aftermath of the battle was, for most Thebans, simply ghastly. Termination of the democracy that had voted to ally with Athens against Macedon [was inevitable] ... Likewise, rewards were of offer for those ‘’’ [who had been opposed to that decision and were now ... willing to implement Philip\s ... mandates.  First of those ... was the installation on the Cadmea, [the citadel of Thebes] of a Macedonian garrison.  The Boeotian federation ... was not abolished, [but Thebes lost its effective hegemony over its members] ...”
   

 

Roebuck observed (at p. 83) that the other main casualty of this defeat was Corinth, which, although it had surrendered without offering resistance:

1. “... had considerable strategic value as the gate-keeper of the Peloponnesus ... [It was therefore] singled out to house a Macedonian garrison, as Ambracia and Thebes had been.”
   

Roebuck noted (at p. 90) that Chalcis in Euboea might also have been garrisoned at this time, and some scholars add nearby Eretria to the list (see the map above),

Panico Stylianou (referenced below, at p. 2) observed, in this first stage of his negotiations with his defeated enemies: 

1. “Philip's first concern was to reach separate bilateral agreements with ... Athens and the Boeotians in particular.  And, he took certain actions, whether by intervening directly or by encouraging his supporters in the cities to act, aimed at ensuring that the balance of power in Greece would be in his favour.  [When this was completed, it was] time to put into effect the plans for settling Greek affairs that must have been maturing in his mind for some years.  At a meeting of representatives from the Greek states held at Corinth, these plans were explained ... and approved.  Doubtless the procedure was a little more complicated than our sources imply, but the outcome was the establishment (the re-establishment rather, after the lapse of 24 years [since the pan-Hellenic peace agreement that had followed the Battle of Mantinea in 342 BC]) of a Common Peace (koine eirene) which all the particular states swore to uphold.”
   

t

In spring 337 BC, Philip arranged a second meeting at Corinth at which he was ‘elected’ as hegemon of the league (albeit that he was not, formally, a member of it).  As Ian Worthington (referenced below, 2008, at p. 163) observed, Philip:

“... had finally defeated the Athenians, rendered the Thebans impotent, stabilised the Peloponnese, neutralised the Spartans and crafted a ‘Common Peace’ that ... made Greece subservient to Macedonia ... [In short, he] had established an empire and, in so-doing, had created the first national state in the history of Europe.”

According to Diodorus, at this meeting, Philip had spoken:

“... about the war against Persia and, by raising great expectations, won over the representatives [of the Greeks to participate in it].  The Greeks elected him the general plenipotentiary of Greece, and he began accumulating supplies for the campaign.  He prescribed the number of soldiers that each city should send for the joint effort, and then returned to Macedonia”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 89: 3).

As Philip prepared to leave for Asia, he probably considered Alexander’s Molossian kingdom and the Macedonian-held cities of Corinth and Ambracia as a buffer zone that would protect the southwestern border of Macedonia itself, should his arrangements under the ‘Common Peace’ break down during his absence.  

Philip’s Last Marriage (337 BC) 

According to Athenaeus (ca. 200 AD): 

“Philip of Macedon did not ... take women along [when he went] to war: ... : rather, ... [he contracted diplomatic marriages that were relevant to his current wars].  Satyrus [see below], in his biography of [Philip], says: 

‘In the 22 years he was king', he married:

Audata the Illyrian, who bore him a daughter, Cynna;

then Phila [of Elimeia in northern Macedonia], the sister of Derdas and Machatas;

then (since he wanted to appropriate the Thessalian people ... on grounds of kinship), he fathered children by two Thessalian women:

... Nikesipolis of Pherae, who bore him [a  daughter], Thessalonike; and 

... Philinna of Larissa, who bore him [a son], Arrhidaeus; 

then, he acquired of kingdom of the Molossians ... by marrying Olympias, who bore him Alexander [the Great] and Cleopatra; and

then, when he conquered Thrace, Cothelas, the king of the Thracians, came over to him, bringing him his daughter Meda, ... [whom] he brought into his household besides Olympias;

then, in addition to all these, he married Cleopatra, the sister of Hippostratus and niece of Attalus, having fallen in love with her. 

When he brought [Cleopatra] into his household beside Olympias, he threw his whole life into confusion.  For, during the wedding celebrations, Attalus said:

‘Now, surely, there will be born for us true-bred kings, [rather than] bastards.’ 

When Alexander, [Philip’s son by Olympias], heard this, he threw [a cup, probably containing wine, at Attalus, who responded in kind].  After this: 

Olympias fled to the Molossians; and 

Alexander (fled) to the Illyrians.

Cleopatra bore Philip the daughter named Europa’”, (‘Deipnosophists’, 8: 557 b-e, translation from Adrian Tronson, referenced below, at pp. 119-20).

Thus, as far as we know, Philip had managed to produce only two legitimate sons by 338 BC:

1. ✴Arrhidaeus (later Philip III), with his 4th wife, Philinna of Larissa; and
   

2. ✴Alexander (later Alexander III/ Alexander the Great), with his 5th wife, Olympias of Molossia, whom he had married in ca. 357 BC.
   

Probably because Arrhidaeus was incapacitated in some way, Alexander rapidly gained an important position in the Macedonian court:

1. ✴a letter that he received from the ageing orator Isocrates in 342 BC suggests that he was considered to be Philip’s likely heir at that time ; and
   

2. ✴according to Plutarch:
   

3. “While Philip was making an expedition against Byzantium [in 340 BC], Alexander, though only 16 years of age, was left behind as regent in Macedonia and keeper of the royal seal.  During this time he subdued the rebellious Maedi and, after taking their city, drove out the Barbarians, settled a mixed population there, and named the city Alexandropolis”, (‘Life of Alexander’, 9:1).
   

Troson pointed out (at p. 117) that Satyrus (knowns as ‘the Peripatetic’) probably wrote his biography of Philip in the late 3rd or early 2nd century century BC.  He argued (at p. 125) that the information that  Athenaeus had taken from Satyrus might well have been no more than: 

“... a list of Philip’s wives and children, of a kind conventionally included in ancient biography, often as part of an obituary. ... Satyrus, as an early (if not, a primary) source might provide a chronologically reliable list of Philipp’s wives, as well as a reasonably accurate (though somewhat sensational) account of Macedonian court life.”

Thus, although scholars sometimes feel free to discount some of these marriages and/or re-order them in order to fit in with the chronology of Philip’s ‘diplomatic offensives’, there is actually no basis to dispute a list of this kind that was written only decades after Philip’s death.  However, he cautioned that it was Athenaeus himself, rather than Satyrus, who was responsible for the theses that:

Philip’s first six marriages were all contracted for political reasons (see p. 120); and

he ‘threw his whole life into confusion’ by his seventh marriage, when, for the first time, he allowed love to influence his decision (see p. 123).

There is no reason to doubt that, during the celebration of Philip and Cleopatra’s marriage:

some sort of confrontation occurred between Philip’s son, Alexander, and Cleopatra’s guardian, Attalus; and

this caused Olympias and Alexander to leave Philip’s court. 

It is also likely that Alexander of Molossia found his sister’s arrival at his court something of an embarrassment.  It seems that Alexander of Macedon soon returned from his self-imposed exile. 

However, for whatever reason, Philip found it expedient to arrange the marriage of Cleopatra (his daughter by Olympias) to her uncle, Alexander of Molossia: as Ian Worthington (referenced below, 2008, at 177) observed:

“The union would tie the two ruling houses even more closely together. ... [Alexander] accepted, and the marriage was scheduled  ... for the  ... summer of 336 BC.”

Philip‘s Preparations for the Invasion of Asia (336 BC)

According to Diodorus, shortly afterPhilip announced his forthcoming marriage to Cleopatra:

“... [he] opened the [pan-hellenic] war against Persia by sending Attalus and Parmenion into Asia [Minor] as an advance party, assigning tpart of his forces to them and ordering them to liberate the Greek cities [there]”, (‘Library of History’, 16: 91: 2). 

Parmenion, as a long-standing commander in Philip’s army, was probably in overall command of this advance party.  (As it happens, we know from a passage by Quintus Curtius Rufus (‘History of Alexander’, 6: 9: 17, translated by John Yardley, referenced below, at p. 137) that, at some point before he left for Asia, Attalus married a daughter of Parmenion).

Prior Events: Greeks and Persians

King’s Peace (387 BC)

This account begins in 387 BC, in the closing stages of the so-called Corinthian War, when the Persian King Artaxerxes II switched his financial support from Athens and its allies (Thebes, Corinth and Argos) to their enemy, Sparta.  This led the Greek belligerents to agree to a peace treaty sponsored by Artaxerxes at the behest of Sparta.  According to Xenophon, its terms were as follows:

1. “King Artaxerxes thinks it just that:
   

2. ✴the cities in Asia [Minor] should belong to him, as well as the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus; and
   

3. ✴the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent (except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which should belong, as of old, to the Athenians).
   

4. [If any of the parties do] not accept this peace, I will make war on them, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money, in company with those who desire this arrangement”, (‘Hellenica’, 31: 1: 31).
   

As Ernst Badian (referenced below, at p. 36) pointed out:

1. “The king himself surely had no reason to ...  insist on the autonomy of the [‘Greek cities, both small and great’].  In fact, the edict seems to have been composed, in detail, to the specifications of [the Spartan statesman] Antalcidas, who became an official ‘friend’ of the King. ... After all, the King’s own interest in all this was strictly limited: he merely wanted to regain secure possession of Asia, [including the Greek-speaking polities there], and, of course, of Cyprus, and he was willing to oblige anyone who would secure this for him.  He neither knew nor cared about the intricacies of [Greek] inter-city diplomacy.” 
   

In the present context, we need not worry about the Greek dimension to this treaty, since our objective is to set the scene for the Macedonian conquest of the Persian Empire.  The key point for our purposes, is that, as Panico Stylianou (referenced below, at p. 15 observed:

1. “With the [so-called] King's Peace [of 387 BC], the Greeks of Asia Minor, Cyprus and Clazomenae were claimed by the [Persian] King as his own,... [and] no leading Greek state disputed this.”
   

Kirsty Mason (referenced below, at p. 224) observed that:

1. “Greece in the 4th century BC was in a period of significant turmoil.  Having defeated the Athenian Empire in the Peloponnesian War and having invaded Persia, Sparta was the dominant state in Greece until its defeat by  Thebes in 371 BC.  However, it is clear that Sparta, and subsequently Thebes,was unable to dominate Greece fully without Persian backing.  [In the closing phase of the Corinthian War], Persian gold was able to support Sparta against Athens, but later it was also able to support Athens, Corinth, Thebes and Argos against Sparta.  [Thus, it seems] that:
   

2. ✴on the one hand, Persian gold itself was desirable to the [leading Greek states] to fund their wars against each other; and
   

3. ✴on the other hand, the threat of Persian gold being bestowed upon their [fellow-Greek] enemies could be used as a potent threat against [them].
   

4. [In the period after the signing of the King’s Peace], both the appeal and the threat of Persian gold were used by Persian kings  ...  to control [both]: 
   

5. ✴Persia’s [bilateral relationship with the [individual] Greek states ...; [and]
   

6. ✴their relationship with each other, via the King’s Peace and its renewals.
   

Isocrates’ Panegyricus (ca. 380 BC)

Shortly after the agreement of the King’s Peace, the Athenian orator Isocrates published a speech, ‘Panegyricus’, in which he deplored the  Greeks’ short-sighted acceptance of the peace agreement that had, in effect, been imposed on them by Artaxerxes II.  As George Dobson (referenced below, at pp. 144-5) observed, this speech was written at:

1. “... a time when the long-continued dissensions of the [Greek] city-states had brought the affairs of Greece to a crisis.   There seemed to Isocrates to be no solution of the difficulties, no chance of established peace or contentment, unless some enterprise could be found which should unite the sympathies of the rival cities, induce them to put their own quarrels aside, and throw them whole-heartedly into a cause which concerned Hellas as a nation.  The only motive which had ever been able to unite the Greeks, even temporarily, was hatred of the barbarians, and Isocrates works upon this feeling.:
   

2. ✴[First], he draws a vivid picture of the miserable state to which the Greek world has been reduced by civil war, and shows how the influence of Persia, besides keeping this [civil] war alive, has in other ways worked towards the ruin  of Greece.
   

3. ✴Having discussed (with outspoken candour) the claims of Sparta and Athens to leadership [of the Greeks], he suggests that they should agree by a compromise, and urges that they and all other States should unite, [preferably under the Athenians], in a racial war against the Persians. 
   

4. This speech had no practical effect.”
   

The character of the continuing inter-Greek hostilities need not detain us: in short, the Thebans’ definitive defeat of the Spartans at the Battle of Leuctra (371 BC) simple saw Thebes replace Sparta as the natural enemy of the Athenians.  As George Dobson (as above) observed:

1. “Despairing of originating any joint action within Greece itself, Isocrates [began to look further afield] for a leader:
   

2. ✴in or about 368 BC we find him writing to Dionysius of Syracuse, who at the time held an empire far more powerful than that of any state of Greece proper, and suggesting that he should come forward as the champion of the Greek national spirit; [and]
   

3. ✴in 356 BC, [he] turned again towards Sparta, this time writing to Archidamus, who had recently succeeded his father Agesilaus in the kingship, ... urging him to take steps which will:
   

4. ‘... put an end to civil war in Greece, curb the insolence of the barbarians, and deprive them of part of their ill-gotten gains.’”
   

As we shall see below, he wrote in the same vein to King Philip II of Macedonia in 346 BC, and lived long enough to witness Philip’s crushing defeat of the Greeks (led by Athens and Thebes) at Chaeronea in 338 BC.  It was only after this victory that Philip could begin his plans for a pan-hellenic invasion of Asia Minor, but he was murdered soon after: it was to be his son, as Alexander III, who brought these plans to fruition and who went on to destroy the Persian Empire after his definitive victory over King Darius III at the Battle of Gaugamela (in what is now southern Iraq) in 331 BC.