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Caesar and Octavian/ Augustus (65 BC - 14 AD)

Caesar (58 - 44 BC) 


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Extension of the Informal Triumvirate (56 BC)

Tripartite Agreement at Luca

Caesar met Pompey and Crassus at Lucca in the Spring of 56 BC to restore their informal alliance.  It was agreed that:

  1. Pompey and Crassus would support the extension of Caesar’s terms as proconsul; and

  2. Caesar would support their election as the consuls of 55 BC.

Proconsular Legislation (56 BC)

The agreement above regarding Caesar’s proconsulship obviously needed to be put into law.  In fact, the Senate met in late June or early July of 56 BC to decide on the allocation of four provinces for the following year:

  1. Caesar’s provinces of:

  2. Cisalpine Gaul (which probably included Illyricum for this purpose); and

  3. Transalpine Gaul;

  4. Macedonia, which was governed by Lucius Calpurnius Piso; and

  5. Syria, which was  governed by Aulus Gabinius.

Cicero delivered his speech De Provinciis  Consularibus, in which he argued (under pressure from Pompey) that Caesar should retain his provinces, and that both Piso and Gabinus (Cicero’s personal enemies) should be recalled.  It seems that Piso was indeed recalled recalled at this point, but that the arrangements for the other provinces were finally made in the summer of the following year (see below).


Consulship of Pompey and Crassus (55 BC)

Cassius Dio recorded that, after a period of turmoil in Rome that disrupted the election of consuls and necessitated an interregnum, Crassus and Pompey were appointed:

  1. ...  as none of the earlier candidates [now] opposed them.  To be sure, Lucius Domitius, who canvassed for the office up to the very last day of the year, [had intended to stand against them] ... but, when [a] slave [in his entourage] was slain, he became frightened and went no further.  Hence, since no one at all opposed them, and furthermore since [Crassus’ son, who was] at that time lieutenant under Caesar, brought soldiers to Rome for this very purpose, they were easily chosen”, (‘Roman History’, 39: 31: 1-2).

Lex Trebonia

Soon after the election of the new consuls, the tribune Caius Trebonius  introduced the lex Trebonia, which made both Spain and Syria consular provinces, with the former allocated to Pompey and the latter to Crassus, each for five years.  This caused considerable opposition, and considerable violence on both sides, but the measure inevitably passed.

Lex Pompeia Licinia

As soon as calm was restored, the consuls introduced the legislation that extended Caesar’s proconsulships for five years.  This prompted further roudy opposition, but, again, the measure passed.  As John Ramsey (referenced below, at p. 44) explained:

  1. “The effect of the lex Pompeia Licinia was to put at Caesar’s disposal five further campaign seasons (aestiva), those of 54, 53, 52, 51, and 50 BC.

It could be justified by the fact that the province of Transalpine Gaul had been far from pacified by 55 BC.  However, it also had another (perhaps intended) consequence: although Caesar’s enemies frequently threatened to prosecute him for the crimes that they alleged he had committed during his first consulship of 59 BC, his proconsular imperium would protect him until at least 1st March 49 BC (provided that he could continue to argue that his services were still needed in Transalpine Gaul).

  1. Parthians defeated and killed Crassus at the Battle of Carrhae (53 BC)

  2. Caesar effectively ended the Gallic Wars with his victory over Vercingetorix at the Battle of Alesia (52 BC), although mopping-up operations continued.

Build-up to Civil War (52-0 BC)

While Caesar was heavily involved in Gaul in 52 BC, Pompey was elected as sole consul (effectively dictator) in order to to deal with serious unrest at Rome.  

Law of the Ten Tribunes (52 BC)

According to Cassius Dio, :

  1. “... now that [Pompey] had the glory that lay in [his election as sole consul], he wished to avoid the envy attaching to it.  He also feared that ... Caesar might be given him as colleague through the enthusiasm of his troops and the populace alike.  First of all, therefore, in order that [Caesar]l might not think that he had been entirely neglected ... , he arranged through the tribunes that Caesar should be permitted even in his absence to be a candidate for the consulship when the proper time came according to law”, (‘Roman History’, 40: 51: 1-2).

Suetonius gave a similar account:

  1. “...  the tribunes planned to make [Caesar] Pompey's colleague [until] Caesar urged them rather to propose to the people that he should be permitted to stand for a second consulship without coming to Rome, when the term of his governorship drew near its end, to prevent his being forced for the sake of the office to leave his province prematurely and without finishing the war”, (‘Life of Caesar’, 26: 1).

John Ramsey (referenced below, at p. 48) pointed out that:

  1. “While it is true that no specific year for Caesar’s [second consulship appears to have been specified in this] tribunician legislation ... , the extension of five campaign seasons (those of 54, 53, 52, 51, and 50) [to his term as proconsul, which had been granted to him] by the lex Pompeia Licinia of 55 BC [above], made it logical for [him] to stand in 49 BC for the consulship of 48 BC, the first for which he would be eligible under Sulla’s requirement that 10 years had to elapse before the consulship was repeated.”

Caesar’s own later account is consistent with this chronology: in his account of the speech that he made to the Senate when he reached Rome in 49 BC, at the start of the civil war, he quoted himself as having said that:

  1. “While [Pompey] himself was consul [in 55 BC], a proposal had been carried [unanimously] by the ten tribunes, to the effect that [I] should be allowed to compete in absentia [in the current year for the consulship of 48 BC], despite the fact that [my] enemies spoke against it: Cato, [for example], opposed [the proposal] with the utmost vehemence and, after his custom, spun out the days by obstructive speech.  If [Pompey] had disapproved [of its provisions], why had he allowed [the law] to be carried ?

This legislation greatly enhanced Caesar’s position viz-a-viz his political opponents: as John Ramsey (as above) explained:

  1. “Because of it, he could stand for office [in the summer of 49 BC, a few months after the likely arrival of his successor in Gaul late in 50 BC] without having to return from his province and without having to surrender his imperium (and immunity from prosecution) as a consequence of being forced to cross the pomerium ...”

Cicero subsequently held Pompey completely responsible for this situation: in a letter that he wrote on the 9th December, 50 BC to Atticus from Trebulanum (in Campania), when Caesar overtly threatened the Republic, he asked rhetorically:

  1. “Why was Caesar’s command extended, and in such a fashion?  Why was there such pressure to get the ten tribunes to bring in the law [of 52 BC] about his candidature in absentia ?  These [interventions have made Caesar] so strong that any hope of resistance [to him] now depends on one man [i.e. Pompey]; and I would prefer that he had not given Caesar such formidable strength in the first place, rather than trying to resist him now that he is so powerful”, (Letter to Atticus, 7: 3: 4).

Pompey’s Lex de Iure Magistratuum (52 BC) 

Later in the year, the situation was thrown into doubt by another legislative development: according to Cassius Dio:

  1. “Pompey revived the law ... that required those who seek an office to present themselves without fail before the Assembly, so that no-one might be chosen in absentia; this law had somehow fallen into disuse ... ”, (‘Roman History’, 40: 56: 1).  

This was obviously inconsistent with the Law of the Ten Tribunes and, according to Cassius Dio,  Pompey subsequently found it prudent:

  1. “.. to grant to Caesar, whose friends were in a terrible state of indignation, the right to canvass for the consulship even in his absence, as had been decreed.  For he had amended the [later law] to read that no-one should be permitted to [stand for election in absentia] unless he had been granted the privilege by name and without disguise; but this [rendered the later law irrelevant, since] anyone of any influence was certainly going to manage to get this privilege voted to him”, (‘Roman History’, 40: 56: 3).

Suetonius made it clear that Caesar’s enemies took the opposite view of the legal standing of Pompey’s late amendment: he recorded that, in 51 BC, one of the leading opponents of Caesar:

  1. “... the consul Marcus Claudius Marcellus ... proposed that:

  2. a successor to Caesar should be appointed before the end of his [extended proconsular] term, on the grounds that the war [in Transalpine Gaul] had ended;

  3. [Caesar’s] victorious army should be disbanded; and

  4. [Caesar himself] should be barred from the elections [for the consuls of 50 BC] unless he were present, since Pompey's subsequent action [i.e. his late amendment] had not annulled the decree of the people.  And it was true that, when Pompey had proposed a bill touching the privileges of officials:

  5. in the clause whereby absentees were debarred from standing for office, he had forgotten to make a special exception in Caesar's case; and

  6. he had not corrected this oversight until the law had been inscribed on a tablet of bronze and deposited in the treasury”, (‘Life of Caesar’, 26: 1).

Pompey’s Lex de Provinciis (52 BC)

According to Cassius Dio, shortly before they had resigned their office, the consuls of 53 BC had:

  1. “...passed a decree that no-one (neither an ex-praetor nor an ex-consul) should assume a command abroad until five years had elapsed; they hoped that such men, by not being in a position of power immediately after holding office, would cease their craze for office.  For, there was no moderation and no decency at all being observed, but they vied with one another in spending great sums and, going still further, in fighting, so that [for example], even the consul Calvinus had been wounded [in the previous year]”, (‘Roman History’, 40: 46: 3).

It seems that this measure had not passed into law by the time of Pompey’s election.  Thus, according to Cassius Dio, he:

  1. “... confirmed the [senatus consultum] that had been passed a short time before, which required that those who had held office at Rome should not be assigned to commands abroad until 5 years had passed.   And yet, after proposing [this measure] ... , he was not ashamed a little later to take Spain himself for five years more”, (‘Roman History’, 40: 46: 1-2).

John Ramsey (referenced below, at pp. 48-9):

  1. “Previously, under the procedure prescribed by the [lex Sempronia de provinciis consularibus (123 BC)], the Senate had to designate consular provinces [for the year ahead] in advance of the consular elections.  [Thus, since] the lex Pompeia Licinia of 55BC  appears to have barred the Senate from considering the assignment of the [Caesar’s provinces] prior to the 1st March 50 BC (unless [he] completed the pacification of Gaul before that date), the earliest that [he]  could have been succeeded [as governor of his provinces] was 49 BC, by one of the consuls elected in the previous year]. ... However, since under Pompey’s lex de provinciis of 52 succession could take place without any appreciable gap between the Senate’s decision [on the designation of consular provinces] and the assumption of power [in such provinces] by the new governor, Caesar became potentially exposed to replacement any time after the 1st March 50 BC.  ... [However], the Senate was not entirely free to do as it pleased because Pompey’s law, unlike the Sempronian, did not ban the use of a tribune’s veto ... Therefore, Caesar’s strategy during the last few years of his command was always to have on his side the services of one or more loyal tribunes.

Senate Decree Relating to the Gallic Provinces (29th September 51 BC)

In early October 51 BC, when Cicero was in his province (Cilicia), his young friend, Marcus Caelius Rufus, wrote to him from Rome to report that:

  1. “As regards public affairs, for a long while nothing was done pending a decision on the Gallic provinces.  But eventually, after many postponements and much grave debate, ...  it became quite clear that [Pompey] was in favour of [Caesar] leaving his command after [1st March 50 BC.  Then, on the 29th September] the Senate passed a decree (of which I send you [copies]) and recorded resolutions”, (Letter to/from Friends, 8:8), translated by D. R. Shackleton Bailey, referenced below, at p. 377).

Matthew Dillon and Lynda Garland (referenced below, at entry 13: 12) paraphrased this decree as follows:

  1. “... the consuls [who had been] elected for  50 BC ... would, on 1st March [of that year], ... bring the matter of Caesar’s command before the Senate and [would propose] no other measure until this ... [one had been] resolved.”

Robin Seager (referenced below, at p. 142) paraphrased the three supplementary resolutions that were  put before the meeting:

  1. ... anyone who tried to obstruct the proceeding [of the meeting on 1st March 50 BC] should be deemed to be acting against the interests of the State; ...”

  2. ... those of Caesar’s troops whose term of service had expired had expired [should be demobilised; and]

  3. ... all the other provinces [should be made] praetorian, so that the Gallic provinces would in inevitably fall to the consuls [of 50 BC] ...”

The copy of these resolutions that Caelius (who was himself a tribune)had enclosed with his letter recorded that all three of these supplementary resolutions had been vetoed by some or all of the following the tribunes: Caius Coelius; Lucius Vinicius; Publius Cornelius; and Caius Vibius Pansa. 


Caelius then expanded on the stance taken by Pompey at this time:

  1. “Moreover, certain remarks attributed to [Pompey] have  ...  greatly raised public confidence.  He said that, before the [1st of March], he could not in fairness take a decision about Caesar’s provinces [presumably because that was the limit of the extension that he had decreed in 55 BC].  However, after this date, he would have no hesitation. 

  2. Asked what would be the position if vetoes were cast at that point, he replied that it made no difference whether ... Caesar intended:

  3. to disobey the Senate; or

  4. to prevent the Senate from passing a decree [by arranging for one or more tribunes to veto it].

  5. Asked what he would do if Caesar were to chose to be consul and keep his army [so that he would need to be elected in absentia],  he replied, as gently as you please: ‘What [would I do if] my son chose to take his stick to me?’

  6. These utterances of his have produced an impression that he is having trouble with Caesar (Letter to/from Friends, 8:8 , translated by D. R. Shackleton Bailey, referenced below, at pp. 383-5).

Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony) as Tribune of the Plebs (50/49 BC)

According to Plutarch, in the summer of 50 BC:

  1. “... matters at Rome came to a crisis, with:

  2. the aristocratic party attaching itself to Pompey, who was in the city; and

  3. the popular party summoning Caesar from Gaul, where he was in arms;

  4. [the tribune Caius Scribonius] Curio, the friend of Mark Antony, who had changed sides and was now favouring the cause of Caesar, brought Mark Antony over to it.  Curio, who had great influence with the multitude, ... made lavish use of money supplied by Caesar, and so got Mark Antony elected as tribune of the people [for the following year] ...”, (‘Life of Antony’, 5: 1-2).

Thus, Caesar planned for Mark Antony to represent his interests in Rome as tribune for 50 BC, just as Curio had done in the previous year.  Furthermore, Caesar decided to boost Mark Antony’s prestige by supporting his election as augur.  Thus, in his addition to Caesar’s ‘Gallic War’, Aulus Hirtius recorded that, towards the middle of 50 BC, Caesar:

  1. “... varied his usual practice, travelling to Italy with all possible speed in order to address the municipalities  and colonies to which he had already commended the candidature of his quartermaster-general, Marcus Antonius, for the priesthood.  He was glad to use his personal influence in the contest for an intimate friend of his own ...  [However, he heard on the way, before he could reach Italy, that Antonius had been elected augur ...”, (‘Gallic War’, 8: 50-1, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul

Caesar did not turn back when he heard of Mar Antony’s election a s augur: according to Aulus Hirtius:

  1. “... he felt that he had no less legitimate reason for visiting the municipalities and colonies [on the region]:

  2. to thank them for affording Antonius their support in so large numbers; and

  3. at the same time, to commend himself as a candidate for the office he sought [i.e. his second consulate] for [48 BC].

  4. For his opponents were insolently boasting that [Caius Claudius Marcellus Maior and Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Crus] had been elected consuls [for 49 BC] to despoil Caesar of every office and distinction, and that the consulship had been wrested from [Servius Sulpicius Galba], though he had been far stronger in influence and votes alike, because he was intimately connected with Caesar by personal friendship and by service as his legate.  Caesar was welcomed by all the municipalities and colonies with honour and affection beyond all belief; ... Having passed rapidly through all the districts of Gallia Togata [his province of Cisalpine Gaul], Caesar returned with all speed to the army at Nemetocenna [the capital of the Gallic Atrebates, who occupied what is now northern France]”, (‘Gallic War’, 8: 50:1 - 52:1, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

We can reasonably assume that Caesar’s main purpose had been to prepare the municipalities and colonies between the Alps and the river Po for his imminent return to peninsular Italy.

December 50 BC

Cicero, who had returned to Italy from his province of Cilicia in November, was based at his villa at Formiae in order to preserve his imperium for long enough to secure the award of a triumph.  On 11th December , he wrote to Atticus (who was in Rome):

  1. “I saw Pompey [yesterday]: we were together perhaps two hours. ... He held out no hope of maintaining peace: he [said that he] had already felt that Caesar was alienated from him and had recently become quite sure of it, when Hirtius, Caesar's most intimate friend, who had been in the neighbourhood, had not called on him.  Moreover, Hirtius  ... [had then secretly left Rome] to rejoin Caesar [on 6th December] ...  This seemed to him to be a clear sign of alienation”, (Letter to Atticus, 7: 4).

Cicero again wrote from Formiae to Atticus in Rome on 26th December, reporting that Pompey, who had been recruiting troops in Campania:

  1. “... caught me up near the Lavernium [yesterday].  We came together to Formiae and had a private conversation [that lasted] from 2pm until evening.   As to your question whether there is any hope of peace, [it seemed to me that] Pompey does not even wish for it.  ... The long and the short of it was that, although [I dread the prospect of war], I felt my anxiety removed as I listened to a man of courage, military skill, and supreme influence, discoursing like a statesman on the dangers of a mock peace.  Moreover, we had in our hands the speech of Mark Antony, delivered on the 21st of December, which contained an invective against Pompey,... [that included] a threat of armed intervention.  On reading this, Pompey remarked: ‘What do you think Caesar himself will do, if he obtains supreme power in the state, when his quaestor [i.e., Mark Antony, who had, by then, taken office as tribune] tribune] dares to talk like that ?’  In short, he appeared to me, not merely [to oppose a compromise with Caesar], but even to fear it.  However, he is, I think, somewhat shaken in his idea of abandoning the city because of the scandal that it would cause”, (Letter to Atticus, 7: 8).

In a follow-up letter to Atticus on 27th December, Cicero rehearsed what he saw as Caesar’s options.  He noted prophetically that, should Caesar lead his army into Italy:

  1. “... we must fight him with arms, while he must begin hostilities:

  2. either at once, before we are prepared; or

  3. as soon as his friends have their demand for the recognition of his candidature at the election refused ... ;

  4. ... once war is begun, we must either:

  5. defend Rome; or

  6. abandon it, and try to cut him off from supplies and other resources”, (Letter to Atticus, 7: 8).

Civil War (49-5 BC)

Two Disastrous Senate Meetings (1st and 7th January 49 BC)

Caius Claudius Marcellus Maior and Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Crus , the consuls who took office on 1st January 49 BC, like most members of the Senate, were staunchly opposed to Caesar.  However, Caesar had at least one vocal supporter: as Plutarch noted:

  1. “From the moment that Mark Antony entered upon his office [as tribune, on 10th December 50 BC], he was of great assistance to those who were managing affairs [at Rome] in the interests of Caesar ”, (‘Life of Antony, 5: 2).

1st January

The surviving manuscripts of Caesar’s ‘Civil War’ begin:

  1. “. . . When Caesar’s letter was delivered to the consuls, their consent for it to be read out in the Senate was obtained with difficulty, indeed after a huge struggle by some tribunes”, (‘Civil War’, 1: 1: 1, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

We can probably fill in the initial lacuna with the help of two other sources:

  1. According to Plutarch:

  2. “... when the Senate would neither receive Caesar's letters nor allow them to be read, Mark Antony, whose office [as tribune] gave him power, read them himself, and thereby changed the opinion of many, who judged from Caesar's letters that he was making only reasonable and just demands”, (‘Life of Antony, 5: 3).

  3. According to Appian:

  4. “Caesar then wrote a letter to the Senate, which Curio carried a distance of 1300 stades [from Ravenna to Rome] in three days and delivered to the newly-elected consuls as they entered the Senate House on the first of January. The letter contained

  5. a calm recital of all that Caesar had done from the beginning of his career; and

  6. a proposal that he would lay down his command at the same time with Pompey ... .

  7. [However]],  if Pompey should retain his command, he [Caesar] would not lay down his own, but would come quickly and avenge his country's wrongs and his own.  When this letter was read, as it was considered a declaration of war ... “, (‘Civil Wars’, 2: 32)

If all three of these records relate to the same letter, then:

  1. Caesar wrote it at Ravenna at the end of 50 BC and entrusted it to Curio, who delivered it to the newly-elected consuls at the start of 49 BC;

  2. Mark Antony, as tribune, ensured that it was read out in the Senate; and

  3. it contained:

  4. the reasonable offer that Caesar would lay down his proconsular command if Pompey would do the same; and

  5. the threat that, if Pompey declined, there would be war.

According to Caesar, although the letter was read out to the Senate:

  1. “... consent could not be obtained for a motion on [its] contents.  The consuls’ motion [then] initiated a general debate about public affairs”, (‘Civil War’, 1: 1: 2, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

This debate was dominated by aggressively anti-Caesarian speeches by:

  1. the consul Lentulus; and 

  2. Quintus Metellus Scipio, Pompey’s father-in-law, in a contribution that, according to Caesar:

  3. “... seemed to issue from the mouth of Pompey himself”, (‘Civil War’, 1: 2: 1, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

In the end, the Senate:

  1. “... backed Scipio’s proposal that Caesar must dismiss his army by a set date. ... This was vetoed by the tribunes Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius [Longinus, probably cousin of the Cassius who famously participated in Caesar’s subsequent murder, immediately] s”, (‘Civil War’, 1: 2: 6-7, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

7th January

The Senate re-convened on 7th January.  On this occasion, according to Caesar:

  1. “... the tribunes were granted no opportunity to protest their danger or even to hold onto their fundamental right by means of the veto.  Instead, seven days into January they were forced to think about their own safety... [when Senators] rushed to the final and ultimate decree of the Senate [i.e. it passed a rarely-used an emergency decree, the senatus consultum ultimum, ...  [proclaiming]:

  2. ‘Let the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the plebs, whoever are of consular rank in the city dedicate themselves so that the Republic take nothing of detriment.

  3. Thus, within five days from the day Lentulus entered the consulship (allowing for the two days reserved for assemblies) Caesar’s governorship ... [was] the subject of extremely urgent and harsh decrees.  [So too were the tribunes], who immediately fled from Rome and made their way to Caesar ...at ... Ravenna ...”, (‘Civil War’, 1: 5: 3-5, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

Caesar also recorded that:

  1. “On the following days, the Senate met outside the city [so that Pompey might attend].  Pompey ... praised the Senate for courageously standing firm, and then stated [that he had]:

  2. ten legions ready; and

  3. ... good evidence that Caesar’s soldiers are estranged from him and cannot be convinced to defend or even follow him.

  4. The remaining issues were referred to the Senate: recruitment should be undertaken throughout Italy, ... [and] public funds [were to be] provided to Pompey.  ... On the remaining issues, senatorial decrees were recorded.  Provincial commands were assigned to men in private life, two at the consular level, the rest praetorian ... These men did not [even] wait ... for the bill ratifying their commands to be put to the assembly; they departed in uniform after announcing their vows.  The consuls left Rome without taking the auspices (another thing that never happened before that occasion) and used lictors in Rome in a private capacity, contrary to every precedent.  Troops were recruited throughout Italy, weapons were requisitioned, money was extorted from towns and taken from temples. All rights, divine and human, were thrown into confusion”, (‘Civil War’, 1: 6: 1-8, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

Cicero summed up the situation in a letter that he wrote on 12th January wrote to his secretary Tiro (whom he had left behind in Greece, so that he could recover from an illness):

  1. “I arrived at the city walls on the 4th of January.  ... I found things in a blaze of civil discord, or rather civil war.  I desired to find a cure for this, ...  but I was hindered by the passions of particular persons, for there are men on both sides, who desire to fight.  The long and short of it is that:

  2. Caesar himself ... has sent the Senate a menacing and offensive despatch [the letter read out on 1st January] , and is so insolent as to retain his army and province in spite of the Senate (and my old friend Curio is backing him up); [and

  3. ... the tribunes] Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius, having been expelled from the house, though without any violence, left town with Curio to join Caesar as soon as the Senate had passed the decree ordering consuls, praetors, tribunes, and us proconsuls [i.e. Cicero himself, Pompey and Caesar] to see that the Republic received no damage [a reference to the decree passed on 7th January]. 

  4. Never has the State been in greater danger: never have disloyal citizens had a better-prepared leader [than Caesar].  On the whole, however, preparations on our side are also being pushed on with very great activity.  This is being done by the influence and energy of our friend Pompey, who now, when it is too late, begins to fear Caesar. ... Italy has been marked out into districts, showing for which part each of us is to be responsible.  I have taken Capua”, (Letters to Friends, 16: 11).

It seems that, when he wrote this letter, Cicero was blissfully unaware that Caesar was already marching south, and that Pompey had disastrously misrepresented Caesar’s military position and also his own.

Caesar’s Invasion of Italy  (10 - 17th January)

The senatus consultum ultimum of 7th January had required Caesar to disband his army on pain of death and, should he refuse, it also exposed any of praetorian rank who remained with his army to the same penalty.  Clearly, he now had to make a decision.  Caesar claimed that:

  1. “After learning about these matters [i.e., both the senatus consultum ultimum and Pompey’s subsequent military preparations], Caesar addressed his soldiers”, (‘Civil War’, 1: 7: 1, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

When he had given his version of recent events:

  1. “He urged the men to protect from his enemies the reputation and prestige of a man under whose leadership they had done the Republic’s business with outstanding good fortune for 9 years while fighting a huge number of successful battles and pacifying the whole of Gaul and Germany.   A shout went up from the soldiers of the 13th legion (... the rest [of his army] had not yet arrived) that they were ready to protect their commander and the tribunes from injury”, (‘Civil War’, 1: 7: 8, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

Caesar claimed that, now that he had the support of his men, he finally decided to disobey the decree:

  1. “Apprised of the soldiers’ goodwill, [Caesar] set out with the 13th legion for Ariminum, where he met the tribunes [Mark Antony and Cassius], who had taken refuge with him.  He summoned the rest of his legions from winter quarters [in Gaul] and ordered them to follow [into Italy] immediately, (‘Civil War’, 1: 8: 1-2, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

It would have taken the tribunes about 3 days to travel from Rome to Ariminum, so Caesar must have arrived at Ariminum on or shortly after 10th January.

Occupation of Ariminium

The Romans had founded the colony at Ariminum (modern Rimini) in 268 BC), on land, at the northern extreme of the ager Gallicus, as a bulwark against the Gauls to the north.  It would have been the first settlement of any kind that Caesar would have encountered as he led his army south along the Adriatic coast from Ravenna.  His account (above) made no mention of how he took the colony.  However, according to Plutarch (whose account is the longest to survive), at the time that the Senate issued the decree of 7th January:

  1. “Caesar had with him fewer than 300 horsemen and 5,000 legionaries: the rest of his army had been left beyond the Alps, and was to be brought up by those whom he had sent for the purpose.  However, he saw that the beginning of his enterprise ... did not require a large force ... , [and that he]  must take advantage of the golden moment by showing amazing boldness and speed ... He therefore ordered his centurions and other officers, taking only their swords ... , to occupy Ariminum ... , avoiding commotion and bloodshed as far as possible; and he entrusted this force to Hortensius [Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, the eponymous son of the famous orator].  He himself spent the day in public ... [at Ravenna.  He then left secretly for Ariminum, having] previously ordered a few of his friends to follow him, not all by the same route ... When he came to the river that separates Cisalpine Gaul from the rest of Italy, which is called the Rubicon, he .... [stopped for a while - see the discussion below for the significance of this river crossing].  Then, going at full speed for the rest of the journey, he dashed into Ariminum and took possession of it before daybreak”, (‘Life of Caesar’, 32: 1-8).

It is unlikely that Plutarch or his source invented the role that Hortensius played in occupying Ariminum.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to see what Caesar would have achieved by the subsequent subterfuge that Plutarch (and a number of other sources) described, and it might have been a later elaboration.  Whatever the true sequence of events, there is nothing in any of the surviving sources to suggest that Caesar had to take Ariminum by force.  It is, of course, possible that he had already reached an understanding with the authorities there during his visit to Cisalpine Gaul some six months before.

Excursus on the Rubicon

Given the importance that is often attached to the theme of Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon, it is strange that Caesar himself did not mention it.  As Jeffrey Beneker (referenced below, at p. 74) pointed out, although:

  1. “... Cicero’s writings include a negative response to the start of the war and to Caesar’s actions in general, ... they [too] make no mention of the river.  Asinius Pollio, who was with Caesar at the Rubicon [see below], almost certainly described the crossing in some detail, but his lost account may be glimpsed only through the filter of later writers [such as Plutarch - see below], which makes it difficult to discover what significance, if any, he attached to the event”, (my change of sentence order). 

Unfortunately, Livy’s account of these events does not survive.  However, according to the 4th century account of Paulus Osirius, which was largely drawn from Livy:

  1. “[After] Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius ... [had been] barred from the Curia and Forum by order of the consul Lentulus [on 7th January], they set out, accompanied by Curio and [Marcus Caelius Rufus], to join Caesar.  After crossing the Rubicon river, Caesar came to Ariminum, where he at once instructed the five cohorts, the only body of troops he had with him at that time, what he expected them to do. With these cohorts, according to Livy, he set out to attack the whole world”, (‘History Against the Pagans’, 6: 15: 3).

It seems from this that Livy had probably recorded Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon, but that he had not drawn particular attention to the fact that it arguably marked the start of his ‘attack on the whole word’.


Jeffrey Beneker  (as above) pointed out that:

  1. “... Velleius Paterculus, [who was writing early in the 1st century AD], provided the earliest extant mention of the Rubicon, [thereby] marking the point in the surviving literature where the crossing itself begins to be synonymous with the outbreak of civil war ...”

In the passage in question, Velleius Paterculus recorded simply that:

  1. “When ... the Senate decreed [on 7th January] that [Caesar] should enter the city as a private citizen and should, as such, submit himself to the votes of the Roman people in his candidacy for the consulship, Caesar concluded that war was inevitable and crossed the Rubicon with his army.  Pompey, the consuls, and the majority of the Senate first abandoned Rome then Italy”, (‘Roman History’, 2: 49: 4).

In this account, Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon marked the start of the civil war.  However, as Jeffrey Beneker  (as above) pointed out:

  1. “It is only in the literature of the Neronian period and later that we find fully developed ‘Rubicon narratives’.  As a result, our modern view of the [significance of the] crossing depends almost entirely upon three relatively late passages:

  2. an episode in Lucan’s epic poem (‘Civil War’, also known as ‘Pharsalia’, 1: 183–235); and

  3. the full but differing accounts in the biographies of Caesar by:

  4. Plutarch [see below]; and

  5. Suetonius (‘Life of Caesar’, 31–32).

  6. By this time, more than a century after the event, the Rubicon has taken on great interpretive meaning, looming large as the thin line between war and peace, between personal ambition and political consensus, and between the old and the new Roman state. “

In Plutarch’s account (which I omitted from the quotation above) we read that:

  1. “When [Caesar] came to the river that separates Cisalpine Gaul from the rest of Italy (it is called the Rubicon), he began to reflect ... on the fearful step [of leaving his province in arms] ... He reflected in silence for a while ... as his resolution wavered back and forth ... For a long time, too, he discussed his concerns with his friends who were present, among whom was Asinius Pollio, evaluating the great evils for all mankind that would follow their passage of the river, and the wide fame of it which they would leave to posterity.  Finally, ... [uttering the phrase] ‘Let the die be cast’, he hastened to cross the river”, (‘Life of Caesar’, 32: 5-8).

Since Plutarch specifically mentioned that Asinius Pollio had witnessed these events, many scholars identify him as the source (or, at least, as one of the sources) for the later tradition.

After Ariminum


Adapted from A. Goldsworthy (referenced below, 2006, at p. 468)

Occupation of Arretium, Pisaurum, Fanum Fortunae, Ancona and Iguvium

According to Caesar, after the apparent failure of mediation by Lucius Julius Caesar (the eponymous son of Caesar’s cousin, the consul of 64 BC) and the praetor Lucius Roscius Fabatus, he:

  1. “... sent Mark Antonys from Ariminum to Arretium with 5 cohorts.  He himself stayed at Ariminum with two [cohorts], and began to recruit troops there. He occupied Pisaurum, Fanum, Ancona with one cohort each.  Meanwhile, having been informed that at Iguvium (a town that the [Pompeian] praetor Thermus was holding with five cohorts and fortifying), the attitude of all the inhabitants toward him was strongly positive, Caesar sent Curio with the three cohorts that he had at Pisaurum and Ariminum.  At news of his approach Thermus, distrusting the community’s attitude, withdrew his cohorts from the city and fled; his soldiers abandoned him on the march and returned home.  Curio recovered Iguvium with great and universal goodwill, (‘Civil War’, 1: 11:4 - 12:2, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

Caesar now controlled all of the main routes between Rome and Ariminum.

Fall of Auximum

Caesar then moved south into Auximum, which seems to have been the centre of Pompeian resistance north of Rome.  According to Caesar:

  1. “Learning of this, and confident of goodwill in the towns [of Arretium, Pisaurum, Fanum Fortunae, Ancona and Iguvium], Caesar withdrew the cohorts of the 13th legion from garrison duty and set out for Auximum, a town that [the Pompeian, Publius Attius Varro] held with cohorts he had brought in.  He was also recruiting troops throughout Picenum by sending senators from town to town.  [However], when they learned of Caesar’s approach, the magistrates at Auximum met as a body with Attius and  told him that the affair was not something for them to decide.  {Caesar claimed that they had insisted that: “Neither we nor the rest of our townspeople can tolerate that Caius Caesar, a commander who has such important public achievements to his credit, should be barred from the town and its fortifications. Furthermore, you should consider the future and your danger.  Disturbed by their words. Varus led out the garrison he had installed, and fled.  A few of Caesar’s advance-guard soldiers caught up and forced him to stop.  A fight began, but Varus was deserted by his men: some of them went home, and the rest reached Caesar, bringing the chief centurion Lucius Pupius along as a prisoner.  ... Caesar ... praised Attius’ soldiers, dismissed Pupius, and thanked the people of Auximum, promising to remember their action, (‘Civil War’, 1: 8:13), translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

This was apparently the first military engagement of the civil war. from Auximum.  Caesar then:

  1. “... traversed the whole of Picenum.  All the prefectures of those parts received him with the utmost gladness and assisted him with supplies of every kind.  Even from Cingulum, a town that [Titus Labienus - see below] had constituted and built at his own expense, envoys came to him and promised to do his bidding with the utmost eagerness” (‘Civil Wars’, 1: 15: 1-2, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

Titus Labienus, who had been born at Cingulum, had been Caesar’s senior legate in Gaul, but he had defected to Pompey shortly after Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon.

Panic at  Rome

Pompey’s Departure from Rome (17th January ?)

According to Appian:

  1. “When the consuls learned [of Caesar’s occupation of Ariminum], they did not allow Pompey to act according to his own judgment, experienced as he was in military affairs, but urged him to traverse Italy and raise troops, as though [Rome itself] was on the point of being captured.  The Senate was also alarmed at Caesar's unexpectedly swift advance, for which it was still unprepared, and ... repented that it had not accepted Caesar's proposals, which it at last considered fair: fear had now turned it from ... [belligerence] to the counsels of prudence.  ... There were many .. prodigies which indicated the [end of the Republic] ... . and the people, who remembered the evil times of Marius and Sulla, clamoured that both Caesar and Pompey ought to lay down their commands as the only means of averting war.  Cicero proposed to send messengers to Caesar in order to come to an arrangement.  As the consuls opposed all accommodation, Favonius, in ridicule of Pompey for something he had boasted a little before, advised him to stamp on the ground and raise up from it the promised armies.  Pompey replied [that he would do so] only: 

  2. ‘... if you will follow me and abandon your horror  at the thought of leaving both Rome and Italy if need be.  Places and houses do not represent the strength and freedom of men; but rather, men, wherever they may be, have these qualities within themselves, and by defending themselves will recover their homes also.’

  3. After saying this and threatening those who should remain behind and desert their country's cause in order to save their fields and goods, he immediately left the Senate and the city to take command of the army at Capua, and the consuls followed him.  The other senators remained undecided for a long time and passed the night together in the Senate House.  However, at daybreak, most of them departed and hastened after Pompey”, (‘Civil Wars’, 2{ 36 -7).

Cassius Dio similarly recorded that, while the mediation of Lucius Julius Caesar and Lucius Roscius Fabatus was still underway, Pompey:

  1. “Pompey ... set out for Campania before the envoys returned, thinking that he could more easily carry on war there.  He also commanded the whole Senate and the other magistrates to accompany him, ... announcing to them that he would regard anyone who remained behind in exactly the same light as those who were working against him.  Furthermore, he ordered them to decree that public moneys and the votive offering in the city should all be seized, hoping that, by using them, he could recruit a vast number of soldiers”, (‘Roman History’. 41: 6: 1-3).

Most scholars believe that Pompey announced his imminent departure from Rome to the Senate on 17th January, and that Cicero referred to his demeanour at this meeting in a letter that he sent to Atticus on 18th March:

  1. “On the 17th of January, I could see that he was thoroughly frightened.  On that very day I detected his design.  From that moment he forfeited my confidence, and never ceased committing one blunder after another”, (Letter to Atticus, 9: 10).

Departure of the Consuls (18th January ?)

Caesar recorded that, when the news of the fall of Auximum reached Rome:

  1. “... the panic that suddenly hit [the city] was so great that, although the consul Lentulus had come to open the treasury to provide money for Pompey in accordance with the Senate’s decree [of 17th January], he fled the city directly after opening the treasury reserve, because false reports [had it that] Caesar was already approaching ... Lentulus was followed by his colleague Marcellus and most of the magistrates.  Pompey, having left Rome the day before, was en route to the legions he had [previously] received from Caesar. which he had distributed in winter quarters around Apulia.  Recruitment in the city’s vicinity was put on hold; nothing north of Capua felt safe to anyone.  Capua was the first place at which they took heart and rallied, instituting recruitment among the settlers brought to Capua by the lex Julia (‘Civil War’, 1: 14: 1-4), translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

On the 19th of January, Cicero wrote to Atticus from Campania, explaining that:

  1. “... Pompey wishes me to be a kind of "president" of the whole of the Campanian seacoast, to superintend the levy, and hold the chief command [here]”, (Letter to Atticus, 7: 11).

Thus, he had obeyed Pompey by leaving Rome, although he was still grappling with the torrent of news and panic:

  1. “What in the world does it mean?  What is going on?  I am quite in the dark:

  2. someone says: ‘We are in occupation of Cingulum’;

  3. someone else says: ‘We have lost Ancona’; and

  4. yet another says: ‘Labienus has abandoned Caesar’.

  5. [Is Caesar] an imperator of the Roman people or [another] Hannibal?  Madman!  Miserable wretch, who has never seen even a shadow of virtue!  And he says that he is doing all this ‘to support his honour’!  How can there be any ‘honour’ where there is no moral right?  Can it be morally right:

  6. to have an army without commission from the state ?

  7. to seize cities inhabited by one's fellow citizens, as a means of attacking one's own country ?

  8. to be contriving the abolition of debts, the restoration of exiles, and hundreds of other crimes ?

  9. ... To return to our friend [Pompey]. In the name of fortune, what do you think of his plan to abandon Rome ? ... would [he] have done the same if the Gauls were upon us ? He says that:

  10. the Republic does not depend on brick and mortar: however, it does depend on altars and hearths;

  11. Themistocles did the same: however, he did so for a  city {Athens] that was incapable of resisting the flood of the whole East.  Furthermore, Pericles did not do so about 50 years later: rather, he abandoned everything except the walls [of Athens]. Our own country men in the old times held the citadel, although the rest of the city was taken [by the Gauls] ...”, (Letter to Atticus, 7: 11).


Corfinium



Pompey reached Brundisium on 25th February.  Cicero later referred to a letter that Atticus had written to him:

  1. “... on the 1st of March, when Pompey had been at Brundisium” for four days”, (Letter to Atticus, 9: 10).

On 27th February, in an earlier letter to Atticua, Cicero had confided that he was:

  1. “... anxious to see what this dash of Caesar's upon Brundisium through Apulia accomplishes”, (Letter to Atticus, 8: 11).


As Caesar marched towards Rome in March 49 BC, the consuls and many other leading Romans left the city in order to join Cnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey) in Greece.  According to Adrian Goldsworthy (referenced below, 2010, at p. 142), when Caesar then left the city:

  1. “Rome was put under the charge of [the praetor] Marcus Aemilius Lepidus [see below] ... [Mark Antony, who already served as tribune] was given special propraetorian imperium, ... and was tasked with overseeing the rest of Italy ... , [despite the fact that this] was still an unprecedented responsibility for a tribune.”

Caesar then left Rome for Spain, to confront the Pompeian legions there and to gain control of the province.  Once this was established, he marched back towards Rome, arriving at Massilia (Marseille) in early October. 



Caesar’s First Dictatorship (49 BC)

The entry in the fasti Capitolini for 49 BC reads:

  1. Consuls [who fled from Rome on 17th January]: Caius Claudius Marcellus Maior and Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Crus

  2. Dictator [for eleven days in October]: Caesar (without a master of horse) for the purpose of holding elections


At this point, Caesar held no political office of any kind.  However, he recorded that, while he was at Massilia:

  1. “... he learned of the passage of a law instituting a dictatorship, and that he had been proclaimed dictator by the praetor Marcus Lepidus”, (‘Civil War’, 2: 21: 5, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

Cassius Dio expanded:

  1. While [Caesar] was still on the way, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus ... in his capacity of praetor, advised the people to elect [him as] dictator, and immediately named him, contrary to ancestral custom.  [Caesar] accepted the office as soon as he entered the city, but committed no act of terror while holding it: on the contrary, he  ... filled the offices for the ensuing year; for up to that time they had chosen no one temporarily in place of the absentees and, since there was no aedile in the city, the tribunes were performing all the duties devolving upon those officials”, (‘Roman History’, 41: 36: 1-2).

Caesar recorded that he:

  1. “... held [consular] elections [for 48 BC - see below] in his capacity as dictator ...”, (‘Civil Wars’, 3: 1: 1, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

He added that he”

  1. “... allocated eleven days to finishing [necessary administrative] business, the Latin Festival, and all of the elections.  He [then] resigned from the dictatorship, left Rome, and went to Brundisium”, (‘Civil War’, 3: 1-2, translated by Cynthia Damon, referenced below).

So far, so good: the norms of Republican tradition had arguably been respected, at least as far as the circumstances allowed. 

Caesar’s Second Consulship (48 BC)

The fasti Capitolini record that the elections that Caesar had held as dictator in his brief first dictatorship (above) led to the consulate of Caesar himself (for the 2nd time) and Publius Servilius Vatia Isauricus.  Caesar, who had probably left Rome for Brundisium before the start of the consular year.  The winter weather impeded his advance across the Adriatic, and Pompey then had the better of the Battle of Dyrrachium (10 July).  However, Caesar emerged victorious  at the Battle of Pharsalus (9th August), at which point Pompey fled to Egypt.  As he approached Alexandria (28th September), the young King Ptolemy XIII invited him to land and sent out a small boat to receive him, but arranged that he should be stabbed to death before he could reach shore.

At this point, Caesar sent Mark Antony and most of the army back to Italy, while he followed Pompey to Egypt, arriving at Alexandria only three days after Pompey’s death.  However, Ptolemy received no benefit from offering Pompey’s head ti Caesar as a gift.  The young king’s exiled sister, Cleopatra, returned to Egypt soon after, and Caesar found himself at the centre of a power struggle between Ptolemy, Cleopatra and their siblings.  An Egyptian army loyal to Ptolemy besieged Caesar and Cleopatra at Alexandria for several months, but the arrival of an army of Roman allies (probably February, 47 BC) proved decisive:  Ptolemy’s army was routed and Ptolemy himself drowned as he tried to escape along the Nile. 

Caesar’s Second Dictatorship (47 BC)

The entry in the fasti Capitolini for 47 BC reads:

  1. Dictator: Caius Julius Caesar (II);

  2. Master of Horse: M. Antonius M.f. M. n (the line through his name in the transcription indicates that it had been removed from  at some point from the inscribed Augustan fasti and subsequently reinstated); and

  3. Consuls: Quintus Fufius Calenus and Publius Vatinius.

Mark Antony and the army arrived back in Italy in the autumn of 48 BC, bringing confirmation of Caesar’s victory.  Plutarch noted that:

  1. “... after the victory, when [Caesar] had been proclaimed dictator [for the second time], he himself pursued Pompey [to Egypt], but he chose Antony as his master of horse and sent him to Rome.  This office is second in rank when the dictator is in the city; but when he is absent, it is the first ...”, (‘Life of Mark Antony’, 8:3).

Cassius Dio noted that Caesar:

  1. “... entered upon the dictatorship at once, although he was outside of Italy, and chose Mark Antony as his master of horse although he had not yet been praetor: the consuls [Caesar himself and Vatia] also proposed the latter's name, although the augurs very strongly opposed him, declaring that no-one could be master of horse for more than six months.  But, by acting in this way, they brought upon themselves a great deal of ridicule, because, after having decided that the dictator himself should be chosen for a year, contrary to all precedent, they were now splitting hairs about the master of the horse”, (‘Roman History’, 42: 21: 1-2).

It seems likely that Servilius had organised Caesar’s appointment as dictator towards the end of their consular year.  Jane Gardner (referenced below, at p. 59) observed that:

“... by December [of 48 BC], Mark Antony was apparently behaving as his master of horse at Rome.” 

She cited a letter of 17th December that Cicero (who had returned  from the Pompeian camp at Pharsalus and was waiting for Caesar’s permission  to return to Rome) wrote to his friend Atticus:

  1. “Antony has sent me a copy of Caesar's letter to him, in which he says that ...  all [of the Pompeians] are forbidden to come to Italy except those whose case he has himself investigated. ... Accordingly, Antony, in his letter to me, begged me to excuse him, since he could not but obey that letter. ... [I replied] that Caesar had told Dolabella to write and bid me come to Italy at the first opportunity, and that I had come in consequence of his letter.  Thereupon he [Mark Antony] made a special exception in his edict of myself and Laelius by name”, (Letter to Atticus, 11: 7).

Clearly, Mark Antony was acting as Caesar’s most senior representative at Rome by this time.


As noted above, Cassius Dio suggested that part of the reason for the objections to Mark Antony’s appointment was the fact that:

  1. “... the augurs very strongly opposed him, declaring that no-one could be master of horse for more than six months. “

Plutarch noted that Caesar finally arrived at Rome:

  1. “... at the close of the year for which he had been chosen as dictator for a second time, [despite the fact] that this office had never before been for a whole year”, (‘Life of Caesar’, 51:2).

It is clear that the length of this second dictatorship had caused some disquiet.  Andrew Drummond (referenced below, at p. 570) observed that:

  1. “When Caesar [had first been] appointed dictator in 49 BC, he [had been] concerned to abide by constitutional norms as strictly as possible: ... the dictatorship itself, which was probably comitiorum habendorum causa [i.e. for the specific purpose of for holding the comitia or elections], was held with moderate propriety and resigned with some ostentation after 11 days.  It was only after Pharsalus that Caesar resumed an office already unpopular with the Roman aristocracy before Sulla used it to reinforce his position late in 82 BC.  Although Sulla's dictatorship had [similarly] not been subject to [the traditional] time-limit of six months, it was not a dictatorship for life: ... it was to be held until Sulla had completed the task assigned to him (probably the establishment of the res publica and the passing of legislation): that task completed, he should and did resign.  Caesar's second dictatorship was not to be of this kind: he wished to hold the office at least until the remnants of the opposition had been crushed, and may already have envisaged its use as the permanent formal basis and expression of his control of the Roman state.  ...  [However, the prospect of a perpetual dictatorship might have provoked] considerable suspicion, if not outright opposition, at a time when his own position was still not entirely secure.  Caesar therefore resorted to the new device of an annual dictatorship ...”

He suggested (at p. 564) that this dictatorship ran from October 48 to September 47 BC. 

As Plutarch observed above, Caesar was away from Rome for almost the entire year of his second dictatorship.: even after the siege of Alexandria was ended, he chose to spend a few more months with Cleopatra (and, when he left, she was apparently carrying his child).  Furthermore, for much of this time, he was incommunicado: as late as June 47 BC, Cicero wrote to Atticus that:

  1. “There is no news of Caesar having left Alexandria; but all agree that no-one else has come from there since the 15th of March, and that [Caesar himself] has written no letters since the 13th of December [0f 48 BC]”, (Letter to Atticus, 11: 17a).

Caesar was finally drawn away from Egypt by the news that King Pharnaces of Pontus (in what is now northern Turkey) had thrown off Roman hegemony.  He therefore marched into Pontus and swiftly and decisively defeated Pharnaces at the Battle of Zela (2nd August 47 BC).  According to a famous  account by Plutarch:

  1. “In announcing the swiftness and fierceness of this battle to one of his friends at Rome, ... Caesar wrote three words: ‘Veni, vidi, vici’ (I came, I saw, I conquered)’, (‘Life of Caesar’, 50: 3).

Thus, Mark Antony had exercised supreme power in Rome and Italy for almost all of this time.  According to Cassius Dio, he found himself facing growing unrest at Rome and a potential mutiny of Caesar’s veterans, who were concentrated in Campania awaiting discharge and compensation:

  1. “Fearing that they might begin some rebellion, [Mark Antony] turned over the charge of the city to Lucius Caesar [consul of 64 BC, Julius Caesar’s cousin and Mark Antony’s uncle], appointing him Urban Prefect, an office never before conferred by a master of the horse, and then set out himself to join the soldiers”, (‘Roman History’, 42: 21: 1-2).

However, even with the aid of his uncle, Mark Antony was unable to deal with either the unrest in Rome or the mutiny in Campania.  As Jane Gardner (referenced below, at p. 59) observed:

  1. “All this, Caesar had to deal with during his brief stay in Rome towards the end of 47 BC, before departing for Africa [see below], and only then, late in the year, were the consuls of 47 BC elected.  They were Caesar’s legates, Quintus Fufius Calenus and Publius Vatinius ...”

It seems likely that Caesar had resigned the dictatorship a year after his appointment, and that Fufius and Vatinius held office as consuls for the remainder of the consular year.  In December 47 BC, he left Rome for Sicily, from whence he would sail to Africa to confront the remains of the Pompeian army.

Caesar’s Third Consulship (46 BC)

The fasti Capitolini record the consuls of 46 BC as Caesar (for the 3rd time) and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the praetor of 49 BC (see above).

Battle of Thapsus (46 BC)

Early in 46 BC, Caesar arrived in Africa to confront an army led by:

  1. Publius Attius Varus, the Pompeian the governor of Africa;

  2. Marcus Porcius Cato;

  3. Titus Labienus, Caesar's former legate, who had changed sides; and

  4. Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio;

reinforced by their ally, King Juba of Numidia.   Caesar defeated this alliance at Thapsus in early April and had completed his campaign by June, when he sailed back to Rome.  According to Cassius Dio, when he had:

  1. “... arranged other matters in Africa as rapidly as was feasible, [he] sailed as far as Sardinia with his whole fleet.  From that point he sent ... troops ...  into Spain against [Pompey’s sons], and he himself returned to Rome, priding himself ... upon the brilliance of his achievements ...”, (‘Roman History’, 43: 14: 1-2).

As Geoffrey Sumi (referenced below, at p. 48) summarised, Caesar, who had been almost completely absent from Rome (first in Gaul and then defeating Pompey) for over a decade:

  1. “... finally returned to Rome in late July 46 BC, basking in the glory of his victory in the civil war ...”

Honours Voted to Caesar

Cassius Dio recorded that, when news of Caesar’s victory ay Thapsus reached Rome, the Senate:

  1. “... voted that a supplicatio (festival of thanksgiving) of 40 days should be offered for his victory.  [They also] granted him permission:

  2. to ride in a chariot drawn by white horses in the triumph [see below] that had already been voted him; and

  3. to be accompanied by all the lictors who were then with him, and by as many others as he had employed in his first dictatorship, together with as many more as he had employed in his second.

  4. Furthermore, they elected him  (for some such name was given him, as if the title of censor were not worthy of him) for three years, and dictator for ten in succession [see below]. They moreover voted that he should:

  5. sit in the Senate upon the curule chair with the successive consuls, and should always state his opinion first;

  6. give the signal at all the games in the Circus; and

  7. have the appointment of the magistrates and whatever honours the people were previously accustomed to assign.

  8. Finally, they decreed that:

  9. a chariot of his should be placed on the Capitol facing the statue of Jupiter;

  10. his statue in bronze should be mounted upon a likeness of the inhabited world, with an inscription to the effect that he was hemitheos (a demigod); and

  11. his name should be inscribed upon the [temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the] Capitol in place of that of [Quintus Lutatius Catulus, consul of 78 BC], on the ground that he had completed this temple after calling Catulus to account for [its the conduct of its restoration in 69 BC].

  12. These are the only measures I have recorded, not because they were the only ones voted, — for a great many measures were proposed and of course passed, — but because he declined the rest, whereas he accepted these”, (‘Roman History’, 43: 14: 1-7).

Two items in this list 

  1. Caesar’s ‘rolling dictatorship’; and

  2. the inscription on the bronze statue of Caesar, which described him as a demigod;

are discussed further below. 

Caesar’s Third Dictatorship (46 BC)

Cassius Dio began his account of the events of 46 BC by noting that Caesar:

  1. “... became both dictator and consul... , holding each of the offices for the 3rd time, and with Lepidus as his colleague in both instances”, (‘Roman History’, 43: 1: 1).

  As noted above:

  1. Caesar had become consul for the 3rd time at the start of the year; and

  2. according to Cassius Dio, shortly before his arrival in Rome after his victory in Africa, the Senate had:

  3. “... elected him dictator for ten [years] in succession”, (‘Roman History’, 43: 14: 4).

Thus, Caesar, while remaining consul, now began his 3rd dictatorship, which would henceforth be renewed at the sat of each of the following nine years.  

Marcus Aemilius Lepidus

As noted above, Lepidus, who had been serving as praetor in 49 BC, was one of only a handful of serving magistrates who had chosen to stay in Rome after Pompey had fled the city.  It seems that Caesar had left him in charge of affairs in Rome as he himself had left Italy to seize the Spanish provinces from the Pompeian legions.   Thus, as Caesar had prepared to return to Rome towards the end of the year, it had been Lepidus who had arranged for his election as dictator, thus enabling him to hold consular elections for [48 BC].   According to Cassius Dio, as soon as Lepidus’ praetorship had ended, Caesar had:

  1. “... sent him into Hither Spain; and, upon his return [to Rome, two years later] had honoured him with a triumph, although [he] had neither conquered nor even fought with any foes ... Caesar, besides exalting Lepidus with these honours, chose him [in 46 BC] as his colleague in both [his 3rd consulship and his 3rd dictatorship] ”, (‘Roman History’, 43: 1: 1-3).

The records in the fasti Triumphales for the period 53-46 BC are lost, but the fact that they included this unusual triumph can be inferred from the fact that they record Lepidus’ triumph of 43 BC (once more in Spain) as his second.  Richard Weigel (referenced below, at p. 31) suggested that Caesar awarded Lepidus his triumph in late 47 BC, as a prelude to his inauguration in the following year as Caesar’s consular colleague. 

Thus, to summarise:

  1. Lepidus, as praetor in 49 BC, had arranged for Caesar to be elected as dictator for the first time;

  2. Caesar had then sent Lepidus to represent his interests in Hither Spain in 48-7 BC; and

  3. as dictator for the 2nd time in 47 BC, Caesar had:

  4. honoured Lepidus’ efforts in Spain with the award of a triumph; and

  5. appointed him as his consular colleague for 46 BC.

Thus, after Caesar had left Rome in December 47 BC for Sicily, from whence he would sail to Africa, Lepidus had found himself once more in charge of matters in Rome, albeit that he now held consular office.  Thus, when news of Caesar’s victory at Thapsus arrived in the city a few months later, it was Lepidus who arranged for Caesar’s election as dictator for ten years in succession.  Caesar then duly appointed Lepidus as his master of horse.

Caesar’s Reception in Rome

It seems that this display of enthusiasm  was not universally shared: thus, Cassius Dio continued:

  1. “When these decrees had ... been passed, [Caesar] entered Rome:

  2. perceiving that the people were afraid of his power and suspicious of his proud bearing, ... and

  3. realising that ... they had voted him extravagant honours through flattery and not through goodwill;

  4. he endeavoured to encourage them and to inspire them with hope by [a reassuring] speech delivered in the Senate ... By such statements in the Senate and afterward before the people, Caesar relieved them to some extent of their fears, but was not able to persuade them altogether to be of good courage until he confirmed his promises by his deeds”, (‘Roman History’, 43: 15:1 - 18:6).

Caesar’s Quadruple Triumph

According to Cassius Dio, Caesar:

  1. “... celebrated triumphs in four sections, on four separate days, for:

  2. the Gauls [whom Caesar had defeated in the campaign that had ended some six years earlier];

  3. Egypt [i.e. Caesar’s defeat of King Ptolemy XIII at Alexandria in early 47 BC];

  4. Pharnaces [i.e. Caesar’s defeat of King Pharnaces of Pontus at the Battle of Zela (2nd August 47 BC)]; and

  5. Juba [i.e. Caesar’s defeat of King Juba I of Numidia, who had committed suicide when he had perceived that his Pompeian allies were doomed to defeat at Thapsus]”, (‘Roman History’, 43: 19: 1).


Caesar’s Fourth Dictatorship (45 BC)

Benjamin Straumann (referenced below, at p. 86) pointed out that the dictatorship of 46 BC had been:

“... designed as a succession of ten dictatorships, each limited to a one-year duration, each of which Caesar was supposed to give up before taking up the next one.”

Nevertheless, as late as October 46 BC, Cicero expected that he would arrange for consular elections to be held before marching to Spain to finish the war with the Pompeians: thus, he asked Atticus to:

  1. “Write and tell me, pray, what Celer reports Caesar to have settled about the candidates: does the great man think of going to [Spain] or to the [Campus Martius for the elections] ?  And, finally, I should very much like to know whether there is any positive necessity for my being at Rome for the comitia”, (Letter to Atticus, 12: 8).

In fact, Caesar no longer felt the need to go through the motions of elections in order to appoint magistrates: according to Suetonius:

  1. “He held his 3rd and 4th consulships [in 46-5 BC] in name only, content with the power of the dictatorship, [which was] conferred on him at the same time  ... Moreover, in both years, he substituted two consuls for himself for the last 3 months, in the meantime holding no elections except for tribunes and plebeian aediles, and appointing praefecti instead of the praetors, to manage the affairs of Rome during his absence”, (‘Life of Julius Caesar’, 76: 2).

Thus, the fasti Capitolini record the magistrates in office in 45 BC as:

  1. Dictator: Caius Julius Caesar (III);

  2. Master of Horse: Marcus Aemilius Lepidus;

  3. Consul: Caius Julius Caesar (IV) (without a colleague)

  4. Consuls (after Caesar’s resignation of this office):

  5. Q. Fabius Q.f. Q.n. Maximus (died in office);

  6. C. Caninius C.f. C.n. Rebilus (elected in his place); and

  7. C. Trebonius [C.f. . .]

It seems that Caesar’s earlier appointment Mark Antony’ as Urban Prefect had re=established the practice, and Caesar was now content to employ it without any reference to Republican precedents: according to Cassius Dio, when Caesar :

  1. “... finally set out himself [for Spain,  he entrusted] the City to [his master of horse, Marcus Aemilius] Lepidus and a number of praefecti (some think eight, although six is more commonly believed)”, (‘Roman History’, 43: 28: 2)

Cassius Dio:

“Caesar was at that time dictator, and at length, near the close of the year, he was appointed consul, after Lepidus, who was master of the horse, had convoked the people for this purpose; for Lepidus had become master of the horse at that time also, having given himself, while still in the consulship, that additional title contrary to precedent”, (‘Roman History’, 43: 33: 1).

Battle of Munda (March 45 BC)

This battle in southern Spain effectively ended the civil wars.  Pompey’s eldest son was killed and his forces were destroyed (although Sextus Pompeius managed to escape  and survived to challenge Caesar’s successor).

According to Cassius Dio, the festival of the Parilia of April 45 was extended on this occasion so that games could be held in the Circus celebration of Caesar’s victory at Munda:

  1. “The Parilia was honoured by permanent annual games in the Circus, yet not at all because the city had been founded on that very day, but because the news of Caesar's victory had arrived the day before, toward evening” (‘Roman History, 43:42).

Caesar was also awarded a triumph.  Plutarch recorded that:

  1. “This was the last war that Caesar waged; and the triumph that was celebrated for it infuriated  the Romans as nothing else had done.  For it commemorated not a victory over foreign commanders or barbarian kings, but the utter annihilation of the sons and the family of the mightiest of the Romans [Pompey the Great], who had fallen upon misfortune;  and it was not meet for Caesar to celebrate a triumph for the calamities of his country, priding himself upon actions which had no defence before gods or men ...” (‘Life of Caesar’, 56:7-9).

The date of this triumph is unknown, but those that were granted to his legates, Quintus Fabius Maximus and Quintus Pedius, took place, respectively, on 13th October and 13th December.

Caesar’s Perpetual Dictatorship (44 BC)

The fasti Capitolini suggest that Caesar formally began 44 BC as dictator for the fourth time:

  1. Dictator: Caius Julius Caesar (IV);

  2. Master of Horse: Marcus Aemilius Lepidus (II)

However, they then record that

  1. Caesar was appointed dictator for life;

  2. Lepidus would initially remain as Master of Horse; 

  3. Caius Octavius (Caesar’s nephew) would succeed Lepidus when he left for war; and

  4. Cnaeus Domitius Calvinus was designated to succeed him in the following year

Finally, they recorded the consuls of 44 BC:

  1. Consul Caius Julius Caesar (V) (killed in office);

  2. Publius Cornelius Dolabella (elected in his place]

  3. [Mark Antony]





Read more:

C. Damon (translator), “Caesar: Civil War’, (2016) Cambridge, MA

B. Straumann, “Crisis and Constitutionalism: Roman Political Thought from the Fall of the Republic to the Age of Revolution”, (2016) Oxford

M. Koortbojian, “The Divinisation of Caesar and Augustus: Precedents, Consequences, Implications”, (2013) New York

J. Beneker, “The Crossing of the Rubicon and the Outbreak of Civil War in Cicero, Lucan, Plutarch, and Suetonius”, Phoenix, 65: 1/2 (2011) 74-99

A. Goldsworthy, “Antony and Cleopatra”, (2010) London

J. Gardner, “The Dictator”, in 

  1. M. Griffin (Ed.), “A Companion to Julius Caesar”, (2009) Malden, MA and Oxford, at pp. 57-71

J. Ramsey, “The Proconsular Years: Politics at a Distance”, in:

  1. M. Griffin (Ed.), “A Companion to Julius Caesar”, (2009) Malden, MA and Oxford, at pp. 37-56

A. Goldsworthy, “Caesar”, (2006) London

M. Dillon and L. Garland, “Ancient Rome: Social and Historical Documents from the Early Republic to the Death of Augustus”, (2005) Oxford and New York

G. Sumi, “Ceremony and Power: Performing Politics in Rome between Republic and Empire”, (2005) Ann Arbor, Michigan

D. R. Shackleton Bailey  (translator), “Cicero: Letters to Friends, Volume I: Letters 1-113”, (2001) Cambridge, MA

R. Weigel, “Lepidus: The Tarnished Triumvir”, (1992) London

R. Seager, “Pompey the Great”, (1979) Oxford

A. Drummond, “The Dictator Years”, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 27:4 (1978), 550-72

D. Fishwick, ‘‘The Name of the Demigod,’’ Historia, 24 (1975) 624–8


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