Adapted from the Digital Atlas of the Roman Empire

Prior Events: Carthaginian Expansion into Hispania (237 - 221 BC)

Hamilcar Barca (237 - 229 BC)

In 237 BC, at the end of the Mercenary War, Hamilcar Barca (who had apparently emerged from the wars in a strong political position) began to consolidate the Carthaginian presence in the southern part of the Iberian peninsular, with his base of operations at Gades (Cadiz).   Eve Macdonald (referenced below, at p. 63) observed that:

1. “The [subsequent] Carthaginian conquest of Iberia and the creation of this new province set in motion a chain of events that culminated in the start of the Second Punic War and Hannibal’s invasion of Italy.”
   

Only a single fragment from Cassius Dio suggests that the Romans entertained any concerns about this development during Hamilcar’s lifetime:

1. “On one occasion in the consulship of Marcus Pomponius and] Caius Papirius [231 BC, they] sent envoys to investigate the movements of Hamilcar, in spite of the fact that they had no interests in Hispania as yet.  Hamilcar showed them all due honour and offered them plausible explanations, declaring, among other things, that he was obliged to fight against the [tribes of Hispania] in order that the money that was still owed to the Romans might be paid; for it was impossible to obtain it from any other source.  The envoys were consequently embarrassed to know how to censure him”, (Fragment 48).
   

This reply would have been particularly resonant in 231 BC, when Carthage was due to complete the payment of the reparations owed to Rome.

Hasdrubal ‘the Fair’ (220 - 221 BC)

When Hamilcar died in ca. 229 BC, his son-in-law and successor, Hasdrubal, continued this process of expansion, creating a new capital at Carthago Nova (New Carthage, modern Cartagena).  According to Polybius, in 226 BC:

1. “Seeing [Hasdrubal] strengthening the Carthaginian influence in Hispania,  ... the Romans were anxious to interfere in the politics of that country. ... However, they did not immediately venture to impose conditions or make war [there] because they were in almost daily dread of an attack from the [tribes of Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul].  They therefore decided to mollify Hasdrubal  ... and to leave themselves free to attack the [Gauls] first ...  Accordingly, they sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty with him, by which the Carthaginians ... engaged not to cross the river Iber in arms, while pushing on with the war with the [Gauls] in Italy”, (‘Histories’, 2: 13).
   

The ‘Iber’ is usually assumed to be the river now known as the Ebro, which is marked ‘Iber ?’ on the map at the top of the page. 

The Romans’ purpose in establishing it as the limit of the Carthaginian sphere of influence was presumably to deter them from participating in the expected Gallic War. 

Events in Italy 219 - 218 BC

It  became inevitable in late 219 BC, when news reached Rome that the Carthaginians, who had long had a presence in Spain (Hispania), had ignored a Roman ultimatum and taken possession of Sagentum (which the Romans claimed to be within their sphere of influence).  According to Livy:

1. “So great was the senators’ alarm ... [that] they trembled rather than deliberated.   For they  ... [realised that they] would have to contend in war ... in Italy and under the walls of Rome”, (‘History of Rome’, 21: 16; 2-6).
   

Actually, Livy was speaking with the benefit of hindsight, since the senators seemed to have imagined that there was at least a possibility that the war could be fought on Carthaginian territory: as he recorded, the new consuls  for 218 BC, P. Cornelius Scipio and Ti. Sempronius Longus:

1. “... were now commanded to draw lots for [their respective fields of operation]:
   

2. ✴Scipio obtained Spain; and
   

3. ✴Sempronius obtained Africa and Sicily.
   

4. Six legions were voted for that year, with such allied contingents as the consuls themselves should approve and as large a fleet as could be got ready. ... The question was then laid before the people: whether it were their will and pleasure that war be declared against the people of Carthage.  When they voted in the affirmative, a supplication was held throughout the City and the gods were besought to grant a fair and prosperous outcome to the war that the Roman people had decreed.  The forces were divided between the consuls as follows:
   

5. ✴Sempronius received two legions, ... together with 160 warships and 12 swift cruisers.  With these forces, ... he was dispatched to Sicily, that he might cross by that way into Africa if [Scipio] was able to keep the Carthaginians out of Italy.
   

6. ✴Scipio was given fewer troops, since L. Manlius Vulso, the praetor, was also being sent into [Cisalpine] Gaul with a considerable army; and of ships, in particular, he received [only] 60 quinqueremes, for it seemed unlikely that the enemy would come by sea or use that kind of warfare. [Scipio] had two Roman legions with their proper complement of horse, and 14,000 infantry of the allies, with 1,600 horse.
   

7. ✴The province of [Cisalpine] Gaul received two Roman legions and 10,000 foot of the allies, with 1,000 allied and 600 Roman horse [commanded by L. Manlius], all intended for the war with Carthage”, (‘History of Rome’, 21: 17).
   

Negotiations between Rome and Carthage came to nothing, and war was declared, probably in May/ June 218 BC, by which time Hannibal was probably already preparing to march towards the Ebro.  John Lazenby (referenced below, at p. 29) reasonably suggested that he  had been preparing for his invasion of Italy since the fall of Saguntum towards the end of 219 BC, but that he probably did not set out on his long march until June 218 BC.

War in Spain

Spain during the Hannibalic War

Adapted from Arthus Eckstein (referenced below, Map 3, p. 192)

According to Livy, P. Cornelius Scipio :

1. “... set out from Rome with 60 ships of war.  Coasting Etruria and the mountainous country of Liguria and the Salui, he arrived at Massilia [modern Marseille], and went into camp at the nearest mouth of the Rhone, ... hardly believing, even then, that Hannibal could have crossed the Pyrenees.  But, when he found that Hannibal was actually planning how to cross the Rhone [at an upstream location], ... he sent out a chosen band of 300 cavalry, with Massiliot guides and Gallic auxiliaries, to make ...  a thorough reconnaissance [of enemy positions] from a safe distance”, (‘History of Rome’, 21: 26: 3-6).
   

Livy then recorded that:

1. “... some three days after Hannibal had left the bank of the Rhone, [Scipio] marched in fighting order to the enemy's camp, intending to offer battle without delay.  But, finding it deserted and perceiving that he could not readily overtake the enemy ... , he returned to ... his ships, thinking that he would ... confront Hannibal as he descended from the Alps.  However, so that he might not leave Hispania stripped of Roman defenders, ... he  sent his brother, Cn. Scipio [cos. 222 BC], with the main part of his troops, to deal with Hasdrubal [Hannibal’s brother] ... He himself, with extremely scanty forces, sailed back to Genua [Genoa], proposing to safeguard Italy with the army [that was already deployed] in Cisalpine Gaul]”, (‘History of Rome’, 21: 32: 1-5).
   

John Lazenby (referenced below, at p. 54) reasonably suggested that Scipio set sail (probably for Pisa rather than for Genoa) in October 218 BC.  He was then detained by the war with Hannibal in the Po valley, suffered a serious wound at the Battle of Ticinus and probably did not arrive in Spain until the summer of 217 BC.

Cnaeus in Sole Command (218-7 BC)

According to Livy, Publius had explained the unusual situation that had arisen to his new army in the Po valley in the following terms:

1. “Soldiers, if I were leading the men that I had under me in Gaul into battle, I would have deemed it unnecessary to address [them, since they had already fought under my command]. ... However, that army was enrolled for service in Spain and is campaigning there under my auspices with my brother Cn. Scipio, where the Senate and the Roman People desired that it should serve.  I have voluntarily undertaken the present conflict so that you might have a consul for your leader against Hannibal and the Carthaginians, [and, in these circumstances], it is right that your new commander should say a word or two to his new soldiers”, (‘History of Rome’, 21: 40: 1-4).
   

In other words, Cnaeus now found himself in command of his brother’s army in his brother’s province by virtue of his brother’s sole authority.  However, if his status was uncertain, his  task was not: he was to ensure that the Carthaginians could not supply or reinforce Hannibal from Spain.

Arthur Eckstein (referenced below, at pp. 191-9) described Cnaeus’ operations north of the Ebro in the period before Publius’ arrival.  He succeeded in securing the support of the coastal communities in this region and in raising Iberian auxilia (auxiliaries) to add to the Roman legions.  He also secured a victory against the Carthaginian garrison at Cissa and possibly a second on the Ebro, as well as carrying out successful naval raids as far south as New Carthage.  Eckstein concluded (at p. 199) that Cnaeus:

1. “...achieved significant diplomatic success during his months of sole command in Spain.  He established Roman power and influence securely along the coast north of the Ebro and extended it into the inland hill country as well, although perhaps with somewhat less success.  ... He acted forcefully and confidently towards the foreign peoples that he encountered despite the fact that his constitutional position was quite unusual (and, to us at least, even obscure). ... the essential fact was that he] was the Roman commander on the spot ... [and] the man with whom [the Spanish communities] had to deal.”
   

However, until Publius’ arrival, probably  in the summer of 217 BC, Cnaeus was content to remain north of the Ebro.

Joint Command of Publius and Cnaeus (217 - 211 BC)

According to Livy, by the time that Publius was ready to leave Rome:

1. “The Senate had extended his command after the consulship and had sent him out with 30 men-of-war, 8,000 soldiers and a great convoy of supplies.  This fleet ... caused great rejoicing amongst the Romans and their allies when it ... dropped anchor in the harbour of Tarraco. There, Scipio disembarked his troops and set out to join his brother; and, from that time forward, they carried on the war with perfect harmony of temper and of purpose”, (‘History of Rome’, 22: 22: 1-3).
   

As Frederik Vervaet and Tony Naco Del Hoyo (referenced below, at p. 22) pointed out, the fact that Publius’ command was prorogued with Spain as his province indicates:

1. “... that the Senate [had retrospectively] sanctioned [his] historic decision to send his older brother, Cnaeus, ahead with the bulk of the consular army before speeding back to Italy in 218 BC. ... Probably around the time of [Publius’] prorogatio imperii in March 217 BC, a popular vote turned ... [Cnaeus] into a proconsul suo iure by decree of the Senate.”
   

Corey Brennan (referenced below, at p. 155) agreed that Cnaeus’ status was probably formalised at this time, although he suggested that a different procedure was adopted:

1. “Despite the silence of our sources, it is probable that, in 217 BC, [Cnaeus] had a special lex de imperium that enhanced his status from legatus to a commander with (praetorian) imperium. ... [There] is no basis for ... [the] hypothesis that [he] ... was [subsequently] granted consular imperium: we possess no designation for [him] during his time in Spain more specific than ‘imperator’.”
   

According to Livy, soon after Publius’ arrival:

“... while the Carthaginians were taken up with the Celtiberian campaign,[Publius and Cnaeus] lost no time in crossing the Ebro and, seeing nothing of any enemy, marched directly on Saguntum, where it was said that hostages from all over Spain were being guarded in the citadel by a small garrison, to whose keeping they had been consigned by Hannibal”, ‘History of Rome’, 22: 22: 4).

We hear of no fighting on this occasion: an Iberian called Abelux apparently switched his allegiance from the Carthaginians to the Romans and arranged by the hostages to escape to the Roman camp, where they were released and sent home.  Livy gushed that, as a result of this service:

1. “The Spaniards ... would have drawn the sword at once [against the Carthaginians] if winter had not intervened and compelled both Romans and Carthaginians to retire to their quarters”, ‘History of Rome’, 22: 22: 21).
   

Although Livy’s account is surely exaggerated, it does suggest that this first foray across the Ebro was intended to begin the process of winning over Spanish supporters south of the river.

The first major engagement between the Scipios and the Carthaginians took place early in 215 BC, when Hasdrubal attempted to cross the Ebro prior to crossing the Alps into Italy with reinforcements for Hannibal.  The Scipios crossed the river, defeated his army and captured his camp at Ibera, although he  managed to escape.  Livy noted that:

1. “When these facts were generally known at Rome through the letter of the Scipios, people rejoiced, not so much because of the victory but because Hasdrubal's crossing into Italy had been prevented”, (‘History of Rome’, 23: 29: 17).
   

Arthur Eckstein (referenced below, at p. 201) argued that:

1. “The battle at Ibera was probably crucial for the general course of the Second Punic War for, if Hasdribal had been able to press on past the Scipios and arrive in Italy with a large army some time in 215 BC (the year after [Hannibal’s major victory at] Cannae), the Roman situation [in Italy would have been dire].  However, in terms of the situation in Spain, the Scipios’ victory [did nothing more than maintain what Cnaeus] had gained in 218/7 BC.”
   

Livy returned to the content of the Scipio’s letter in a later passage:

1. “At the end of the summer  [of 215 BC], a letter arrived from Publius and Cnaeus Scipio, reporting how great and how successful had been their operations in Spain.  [However], they also reported] that money  ... was  lacking for the army and for the [naval] crews ...  They said that, so far as pay was concerned, if the treasury was empty, they would find some method of getting it from the Spaniards, but everything else ... must ... be sent from Rome if  the army and the province were to be kept.  After the reading of the letter, everyone admit that the statements were true and the demands fair, but they [also had to consider] that:
   

2. ✴they were already maintaining huge forces on land and sea;
   

3. ✴a large new fleet would be needed if a Macedonian war should begin;
   

4. ✴Sicily and Sardinia, which before the war had paid taxes in kind, were [now] hardly feeding the armies that garrisoned those provinces;
   

5. ✴necessary expenses were met only by the property tax, but:
   

6. •the number of those who paid that particular tax had been diminished by such great losses of troops at Lake Trasimene and also at Cannae; and
   

7. •if the few who survived should be burdened by a much greater levy, they would perish by another malady.
   

8. ... [They decided that] what was needed for the army in Spain [would have to be borrowed, on the condition that [the creditors] should be the first to be paid, as soon as there was money in the treasury.  To this effect the praetor addressed the people, and named a date on which he would let the contracts for furnishing clothing and grain to the army in Spain and whatever else was needed for the crews.
   

John Richardson (referenced below, at p. 39) observed that:

1. “ The fact that the Senate was prepared to go to such lengths to supply the Spanish army, despite the evident possibility of fraud, shows the importance that it attached to the Spanish campaign.)
   

These financial constraints probably explain why the Scipios were unable to follow up their victory at Ibera.  Nevertheless, they did achieve an important symbolic victory when they secured Saguntum: Arthur Eckstein (referenced below, at p. 202, note 61) noted that:

1. “The actual date of the fall of Saguntum to the Scipios is unclear.  Livy (‘History of Rome’, 24: 42: 9-11) has it under 214 BC but adds that the town was captured in the 8th year of its being under [Carthaginian] control, ... which would place its fall in 212/1 BC.”
   

John Richardson (referenced below, at p. 40), who dated the fall of Saguntum to 212 BC, argued that:

1. “Although it would be rash to be too certain about the position in Spain at this time, it is likely that ... Publius and Cnaeus Scipio were [now] in control of the eastern seaboard from Emporion to Saguntum, and had successfully prevented the establishment of Carthaginian [supply lines] between Spain and Italy.  Their policy (so far as it can be identified) seems to have been one of:
   

2. ✴steadily building up good relations with local tribal leaders;
   

3. ✴confining Hasdrubal, as far as possible, to southern Spain and certainly [keeping him] south of the Ebro; and
   

4. ✴avoiding ... unnecessary extension of their forces, [since this]might have placed at risk the separation of Hannibal from his base and his supplies, which was the fundamental reason for their presence in Spain at all.”
   

We should now return to the formal status of Publius and Cnaeus.  As we have seen, Livy had recorded that Publius had received Spain as his province in 218 BC (when he was consul) and in  217 BC (when he was prorogued as proconsul.  We hear nothing more about the formal status of either man until 212 BC: in a comprehensive list of the provincia of that year, we read that:

1. “Hispaniae P. et Cn. Corneliis (Publius and Cnaeus [Cornelius Scipio were allotted] the Spains)”, (‘History of Rome’, 25: 3: 6). 
   

John Richardson (referenced below, at p. 41) argued that:

1. “ This should imply that both were now holding imperium,  and that they were, at least formally, independent of one another, each with his own provincia.  Cnaeus' position as a holder of imperium  is confirmed by the description of him as imperator  by Livy on three occasions after this (two in the context of senatorial debates), although the word has not previously been applied to him.
   

According to Livy, in the summer of 211 BC, the Scipios:

1. “... united their forces and a council was summoned.  The participants agreed that, although their only object so far had been to prevent Hasdrubal from marching into Italy, it was now time that an effort should be made to end the war in Spain, and they thought that the 20,000 Celtiberian [mercenaries that they had recently added to their forces  would give them sufficient] strength”, (‘History of Rome’, 25: 32: 1-3).
   

Arthur Eckstein (referenced below, at pp. 206-7) observed that:

1. “In the end, of course, the [Scipio’s] offensive of 211 BC ended in disaster.  [They had] underestimated the number and size of the Carthaginian armies ranged against them; they divided their own forces in two, and both parts were severely defeated:
   

2. ✴[Publius] was killed trying to prevent crucial ... reinforcements ... reaching the Carthaginians; and
   

3. ✴[Cnaeus] was [subsequently] deserted at a vital moment by the Celtiberian mercenaries: he too was killed in battle, and much of his army was destroyed.”
   

Fortunately, the Carthaginians were not able to make significant inroads across the Ebro, probably because of disunity among their commanders.  The Romans were therefore able to maintain a presence there, since:

1. ✴two junior officers, L. Marcius and Ti. Fonteius were able to take over command of what was left of the Roman army (see ‘History of Rome’, 25: 37: 1-7); and
   

2. ✴ the pro-Roman communities in the area apparently remained loyal.
   

The status of Cnaeus is not quite as clear cut as this might suggest:

1. ✴It is certainly true that, on a number of occasions after Publius’ eventual arrival in Spain (see below), Livy:
   

2. •recorded that Publius  and Cnaeus divided their forces between them (see, for example, ‘History of Rome’, 23: 26: 2), which suggests that each exercised an independent command; and
   

3. •referred to Cnaeus as  imperator:
   

4. -before Publius’ arrival (see, for example, ‘History of Rome’, 21: 60: 6);
   

5. -after Publius’ arrival (see, for example, ‘History of Rome’, 23: 27: 11, which refers to 216 BC); and
   

6. •after Publius’ death, when he referred to:
   

7. “... the army of which Cn. Scipio had been the commander”, ( ‘History of Rome’, 26: 2: 5).
   

Command of C. Claudius Nero (210 BC)

According to Livy, when news of the fate of the Scipios’ reached Rome. the Senate agreed that:

1. “... the plebeian tribunes should be persuaded to bring before the plebs at the earliest possible moment the question as to whom they preferred to send with full authority to Spain and the army of which Cn. Scipio had been the commander.  The matter was arranged with the tribunes and due notice given”, (‘History of Rome’, 26: 2: 5-6)
   

The plebs seem to have voted for C. Claudius Nero, since Livy recorded that:

1. “... the Senate, having discharged its responsibilities so far as concerned Capua, voted to assign to C.  [Claudius] Nero:
   

2. ✴6.000 infantry and 300 cavalry of his own choosing from the two legions that  he had [commanded at] Capua; and
   

3. ✴the same number of infantry and 800 cavalry from the Latin allies.
   

4. Nero sailed with this army from Puteoli to ... Tarraco, ... [where he] armed even the crews to increase his numbers.  Then,  setting out for the river Ebro, he took over the [Scipio’s] army from Ti.Fonteius and L. Marcius”, (‘History of Rome’, 26: 17: 1-2).
   

As Arthur Eckstein (referenced below, at p. 208) observed, he seems to have ambushed Hasdrubal Barca and his army, but to have entered into negotiations that lasted just long enough to allow  Hasdrubal and his army to escape.

Younger Scipio in Spain (210 - 206 BC)

In construction

210 BC

Appointed by popular vote to the command in Spain with as proconsul and arrived with his forces in the early autumn (Liv. 26: 18-20)

209 BC

Proconsulship prorogued until the Senate should recall him (Liv. 27.7.17).

He captured New Carthage and won in the subsequent settlements the favour and support of many Spanish tribes (Polyb. 10.6-17; Liv. 26.41-51; 27.17.1-7)

208 BC

Imperium prorogued in Spain (Liv. 27.22.7). Defeated Hasdrubal at Baecula and captured the young Massiva (Polyb. 10.37-40; Liv. 27.17-20

207 BC

Continued in command in Spain, where he directed the operations of M. Junius Silanus against Celtiberia and L. Scipio against Orongis (Liv. 28.1-4; cf. 27.36.12, and 38.11

206 BC;

Continued in command in Spain.

Here he won the battle of Ilipa and drove the Carthaginians out of Spain, visited Syphax in Africa, punished a number of Spanish towns, captured Gades, quelled a mutiny among his own soldiers, and the revolt of several Spanish tribes (Polyb. 11.20-33; Liv. 28.12-37)

When Scipio traveled to Numidia to meet with Syphax, he left Silanus in charge of the Roman forces based at Carthago Nova, while L.Marcius Septimus was placed in command at Tarraco.

According to Livy:

1. “After [Scipio’s] departure Masinissa [see below] came to a secret understanding with Silanus, and crossed over with a small following to Africa, to induce his people to support him in his new policy.  The reasons which determined him on this sudden change were not evident at the time, but the loyalty which he subsequently displayed throughout his long life to its close proved beyond question that his motives at the beginning were carefully weighed”, (‘History of Rome’, 28: 16: 10-12).
   

Scipio returned to Rome late in the year to report on his achievement (Liv. 28.38.1-6;  and become Consul.  According to Livy (28.38.4; 31.20.3; cf. Dio fr. 57.56; Val. Max. 2.8.5) he was refused a triumph, according to Polybius (11.33.7) and Appian (Ib. 38; cf. Dio fr. 57.56) he received one. Perhaps he celebrated an ovation.   Not listed in Rich.

Scipio’s Invasion of Africa (205 - 1 BC)

Adapted from this page in Wikipedia

According to Livy, when Scipio, on his arrival in Rome in 206 BC, formally reported his victories in Spain at a meeting of the Senate in the temple of Bellona:

1. “He was not without hope that a triumph might be accorded to him for his services; he did not, however, press his demand for one, as it was quite understood that no one had up to that time enjoyed a triumph who was not invested with a magistracy”, (‘History of Rome’, 28: 38: 4).
   

He was, however  elected  as consul for 205 BC, and received the provincia of Sicily without a ballot, since his colleague, Crassus (see above) could not leave Italy since he was the serving pontifex maximus.  According to Livy, he continued in 204 BC as proconsul in both Sicily and Africa (‘History of Rome’, 29: 13: 3).  He faced a number of political obstacles in this year, but he eventually crossed into Africa (‘History of Rome’, 29: 26).  His proconsular imperium in Africa was then extended in Africa for:

1. ✴203 BC (‘History of Rome’, 30: 1: 10);
   

2. ✴202 BC, following a vote of the tribunes (‘History of Rome’, 30: 27: 1-5); and
   

3. ✴201 BC (‘History of Rome’, 30: 41: 1). 
   

Scipio’s landing at Utica in 204 BC marked the Romans’ first serious attempt to take the war into Carthaginian territory.  He was soon joined by Masinissa of Numidia (the leader of a formidable cavalry, who faced opposition from another Numidain prince, Syphax), who had changed his allegiance from Carthage to Rome in 206 BC. He laid siege to Utica and established winter quarters outside the city.

The Carthaginian defence was entrusted to Hasdrubal Gisgo, who was allied with Syphax.  They attempted to relieve Utica early in 203 BC but were defeated, and their armies regrouped on what the Romans referred to as the Campi Magni (Great Plains).  They suffered another major defeat there, and Carthage itself was now vulnerable.  Syphax escaped to Cirta, with Masinissa and C. Laelius, Scipio’s legate, in pursuit.  Syphax marched out to confront them but was defeated and taken prisoner, at which point Masinissa captured Cirta, which gave him undisputed control of Numidia.  According to Ovid (‘Fasti’, 6: 769), Masinissa’s capture of Syphax took place on June 23rd.

In 202 BC, Hannibal was decisively defeated at Zama and  fled to Tyre, leaving Scipio to impose onerous peace terms on the Carthaginians: according to Livy:

1. “They were to be a free State, living under their own laws, and all the cities, all the territory and all the frontiers that they had held before the war they were to continue to hold ... [However, they were required]:
   

2. ✴to restore to the Romans all the deserters, refugees and prisoners;
   

3. ✴to deliver up their warships, retaining only 10 triremes and all their trained elephants and to  not to train any more;
   

4. ✴to refrain from making war either within or beyond the frontiers of Africa without the permission of Rome;
   

5. ✴to restore all his possessions to Masinissa and make a treaty with him; ... [and]
   

6. ✴to pay a war indemnity of 10,000 talents of silver, the payment to be in equal annual instalments, extending over 50  years”, (‘History of Rome’, 30: 37: 1-6).
   

All this meant the end of  Carthage as a significant power in the Mediterranean.

According to Livy:

1. “As peace was now established on land and sea, Scipio  sailed to Lilybaeum with his army.  From there, he sent the greater part of his army ahead in the ships, while he himself travelled through Italy ... and made his way to Rome through multitudes who poured out from the cities to do him honour ...  The triumphal procession in which he rode into the City was the most brilliant that had ever been seen.  The weight of silver which he brought into the treasury amounted to 123,000 pounds.  Out of the booty, he distributed 40 asses to each soldier.  ...  As to the sobriquet of Africanus, I cannot say for certain whether it was:
   

2. ✴conferred upon him by the devotion of his soldiers or by popular acclaim; or
   

3. ✴(as in the recent instances of Sulla Felix and Pompey the Great) originated in the flattery of his friends”, (‘History of Rome’, 30: 45: 1-6).